It formally began on 14 September; its objective was to neutralise the JNA positions in ZNG-held territory and to secure arms and ammunition supplies for the poorly equipped ZNG.

In 1990, ethnic tensions between Serbs and Croats worsened after the electoral defeat of the government of the Socialist Republic of Croatia by the Croatian Democratic Union (Hrvatska demokratska zajednica, HDZ).

The Yugoslav People's Army (Jugoslovenska Narodna Armija – JNA) confiscated Croatia's Territorial Defence (Teritorijalna obrana – TO) weapons to minimize resistance.

[1] On 17 August, the tensions escalated into an open revolt of Croatian Serbs,[2] centred in the predominantly Serb-populated areas of the Dalmatian hinterland around Knin (approximately 60 kilometres (37 miles) north-east of Split),[3] parts of the Lika, Kordun, Banovina and eastern Croatia.

[5] The request was denied and a bloodless skirmish between Serb insurgents and Croatian special police in March[6] prompted the JNA itself to ask the federal Presidency to give it wartime authority and declare a state of emergency.

[8] In early April, leaders of Serb revolt in Croatia declared their intention to integrate the area under their control with Serbia.

The most effective part of the force was 3,000-strong special police deployed in twelve battalions and adopting military organization of the units.

[10] As a response to the deteriorating situation, the Croatian government established the Croatian National Guard (Zbor narodne garde – ZNG) in May by merging the special police battalions into four all-professional guards brigades together consisting of approximately 8,000 troops subordinate to the Ministry of Defence headed by retired JNA General Martin Špegelj.

Croatian President Franjo Tuđman's first plan was to win support from the European Community (EC) and the United States for Croatia; he dismissed advice to seize JNA barracks and storage facilities in the country.

The conference started on 7 September, but only four days later, the Croatian member and chair of the presidency Stjepan Mesić ordered the JNA to return to its barracks within 48 hours.

[18] The same day, the ZNG and the Croatian police blockaded and cut utilities to all JNA facilities it had access to, beginning the Battle of the Barracks.

[19] The move blockaded 33 large JNA garrisons in Croatia,[20] and numerous smaller facilities, including border posts and weapons and ammunition storage depots.

[21] Several JNA posts were attacked by the ZNG before the blockade was officially sanctioned, largely in response to local battlefield situations.

The first such incident was a failed attack on JNA barracks in Sinj on 25 August, in response to the deterioration of ZNG positions in the nearby village of Kijevo.

[33][36] Croatian forces also captured the Žrnovnica missile base and JNA weapons storage facilities near Daruvar,[31][37] Otočac,[29] Križevci and Virovitica.

[55] The negotiations were initiated after the JNA 1st Guards Mechanised Division reached Vinkovci on 25 September, forcing the ZNG to accept the evacuation.

[38] On 14/15 September, Croatian forces seized a DJČ-612 landing craft from the Yugoslav Navy while it was undergoing repairs in Vela Luka shipyard; they sailed the vessel the same night into the Cetina River.

By 5 October, Zadar was completely surrounded by the JNA and the situation prompted Croatian authorities in the city to seek a ceasefire and negotiations.

[63] The agreement stipulated that the evacuated units would leave Croatian soil and the JNA generally respected the obligation,[64] even though twenty truckloads of weapons were left to the Serbian population in the hinterland around Zadar.

[65] In the wake of the bombing of Banski dvori of 7 October, Croatian authorities instructed the ZNG to assault and capture JNA barracks in the Zagreb area if commanders considered it possible.

[46] At the same time, personnel at the JNA's Borongaj barracks in Zagreb were allowed to evacuate in return for free passage of a convoy carrying humanitarian aid to Vukovar, where the battle to control the city was in progress.

[73] On 8 November, Davorin Rudolf representing Croatian authorities, and Lieutenant Colonel General Marijan Čad—JNA commanding officer of the 13th (Rijeka) Corps—agreed to evacuate the corps personnel and equipment from Croatia.

[77] The Yugoslav Navy's bombardment of Split, Šolta and Brač on 15 November—in response to the loss of a Mukos (PČ-176) patrol boat—and the subsequent Battle of the Dalmatian channels appeared to have derailed the Žitnić agreement.

[82] The Battle of the Barracks resulted in a large increase of ZNG/HV capabilities—allowing complete arming of its existing units, raising of additional 40–42 brigades and fielding 200,000 troops and 40,000 police by the end of the year.

[83] While there is no information on the number of troops involved or casualties sustained on either side, the JNA garrisons in Croatia were significantly undermanned at the time.

[91][92] Both in 1991 and years later, Špegelj criticised Tuđman's decision to disregard his advice to attack the JNA barracks earlier than September—specifically during the Ten-Day War in Slovenia in June–July 1991.

Špegelj said that an earlier move, preempting deterioration of the strategic situation in Croatia, would best serve Croatian defensive needs.

[94] Zdravko Tomac, deputy prime minister of a national unity government in Croatia at the time, and later an opposition leader, stated that while Špegelj's view was militarily correct, Tuđman's position was politically better.

[100] The parties to the accord also agreed to the deployment of a UN peacekeeping mission in Croatia, later initiated through the subsequent United Nations Security Council Resolution 721 of 27 November.

The issue was resolved through an agreement of 18 December made between Rašeta and Agotić stipulating that the JNA would provide the HV with the missing weapons from its own stocks, and the evacuation resumed.