The campaign was perceived as a decisive Israeli victory, causing reorganizations in the Syrian high command and the birth of heroic tales in Israel.

[9] As such, the Syrians massed their forces in that area; however, after they found out that Lebanon did not wish to actively participate in combat, their plans changed to an attack from the southern Golan Heights on Samakh (Tzemah) and later Tiberias.

After the sudden plan change, the force moved to Nabatieh, and proceeded around the Finger of the Galilee to Banias and Quneitra, from which the eventual attack was staged.

[11] According to plan, the Syrians attacked from the southern Golan Heights, just south of the Sea of Galilee through al-Hama and the Yarmouk River, hitting a densely populated Jewish area of settlement.

[12] The Jewish villages on the original confrontation line were Ein Gev, Masada, Sha'ar HaGolan and Degania Alef and Beit.

On Friday, 14 May, the Syrian 1st Infantry Brigade, commanded by Colonel Abdullah Wahab el-Hakim, was in Southern Lebanon, positioned to attack Malkia.

[1] The Haganah forces in the area consisted of several units from the Barak (2nd) Battalion of the Golani Brigade, as well as the indigenous villagers, including a reduced Guard Corps (HIM) company at the Samakh (Tzemah) police station.

He authorized his men to seize all necessary arms from the settlements and urged them to dig in and build fortifications as fast as possible, and to mobilize all the necessary work force to do so.

[15] On Saturday night, 15 May, the observation posts reported many vehicles with full lights moving along the Golan ridge east of the Sea of Galilee.

[19] Aharon Israeli, a platoon leader, commented that there was also a severe lack of experienced field commanders—he himself was hastily promoted on 15 May, despite not having sufficient knowledge or experience.

[1] This was spotted and reported by the Israelis at Tabgha,[21] and the additional reprieve allowed the Kinarot Valley villages to evacuate the children, elderly and sick, as well as conduct maneuvers which feigned massive reinforcements in the Poria-Alumot region.

[1] In the panic of surprise, many men also tried to flee the frontal villages, but blockposts were set up near Afula and Yavne'el by the Military Police Service's northern command, under Yosef Pressman, who personally stopped buses and allowed only the women and children to proceed to safety.

[22] At about 04:30 on 18 May,[23] the Syrian 1st Brigade, now commanded by Brigadier General Husni al-Za'im and consisting of about 30 vehicles, including tanks, advanced west towards Samakh (Tzemah) in two columns—one across the coast, and another flanking from the south.

[23] A soldier who participated in the battle reported that only 20 uninjured troops were left to defend the police station as the second Syrian column reached Samakh (Tzemah).

[25] On the same day, Syrian aircraft bombed the Israeli village Kinneret and the regional Beit Yerah School, on the southwestern shore of the Sea of Galilee.

[26] On the morning of 19 May, a message was sent from Sha'ar HaGolan and Masada that they were preparing for an evacuation; when the order was given to stay put, the villages had already been abandoned, most defenders retreating to Afikim.

He also wrote that Yigael Yadin, the Chief Operations Officer of the Haganah, told him that there was no alternative to letting the Arabs approach to within twenty to thirty meters of the gates of Degania and fight their tanks in close combat.

He and Ben-Gurion argued over where to send the Yishuv's only battery of four pre-World War I 65 mm mountain guns, nicknamed "Napoleonchikim", which had no proper sights.

[30] After the fall of Tzemah, the Haganah command realized the importance of the campaign in the region, and made a clear separation between the Kinarot Valley, and the Battle of Gesher fought against Transjordan[31] and Iraq to the south.

The Syrians were not intending to carry out any further operation south of the Sea of Galilee and planned to make their main effort further north, near the Bnot Ya'akov bridge.

The Syrians complied, their main objective being to seize the bridge across the river north of Degania Alef, thus blocking any Israeli attack from Tiberias against the Iraqi line of communications.

[5] Unlike the attack on Samakh (Tzemah), this action saw the participation of nearly all of the Syrian forces stationed at Tel al-Qasr, including infantry, armor and artillery.

[38] While the soldiers who operated the cannons (still lacking sights) were not proficient in handling them, an acceptable level of accuracy was achieved after practice shots into the Sea of Galilee.

In all, the artillery fire took the Syrian army by complete surprise, and the latter decided to regroup and retreat to Tel al-Qasr, also recalling the company at Sha'ar HaGolan and Masada.

The 3rd Battalion from the Palmach's Yiftach Brigade had been sent by boat during the previous night across the sea to Ein Gev, planning to assault and capture Kafr Harib.

[37] On 21 May, Haganah troops returned to Samakh (Tzemah) and set up fortifications,[1] The damaged tanks and armored cars were gathered and taken to the rear.

The full report read: Our forces repelled yesterday a heavy attack of tanks, armored vehicles and infantry that lasted about 8 hours.

[43] In the wake of the fall of Gush Etzion, news of Degania's successful stand (as well as that of Kfar Darom) provided a morale boost for other Israeli villages.

[21] The flight from Masada and Sha'ar HaGolan, on the other hand, stirred controversy in the young state, fueled by news of the Kfar Etzion massacre just days before, and the Palmach issued a newsletter accusing them of abandoning national assets, among other things.

[27] The battles of the Kinarot Valley were the first and last of the major ground engagements between Israel and Syria to the south of the Sea of Galilee, although minor patrol skirmishes continued until the first ceasefire.