Although there were a few battleship-on-battleship engagements, battleships had little impact on the destroyer and submarine Battle of the Atlantic, and aircraft carriers determined the outcome of most of the decisive fleet clashes of the Pacific War.
The superior numbers of British surface units devoted themselves to protecting the convoys, and to seek-and-destroy missions against the German ships, assisted by both naval and land-based aircraft and by sabotage attacks.
While attempting to attack Arctic Convoys, Scharnhorst was sunk at the Battle of North Cape by a British force of destroyers, cruisers, and the battleship Duke of York.
Battleships also proved their continued worth as vessels of sea control by deterring the sortie of the remaining heavy German warships into the North Atlantic during the operation.
They were hampered by technical deficiencies (slow battleships were incapable of operating with fast carriers), faulty military doctrine (the Japanese waited for a "decisive battle", which never came), and defective dispositions (as at Midway).
However, Prime Minister Winston Churchill was optimistic about the improving situation in the North Atlantic and Mediterranean and allocating two ships to the defense of Singapore was seen as a compromise.
North Carolina and South Dakota were ready by summer of 1942 and provided anti-aircraft defense during the Eastern Solomons and Santa Cruz Islands carrier battles.
The two Fusō and two Ise-class battleships, despite their extensive modernization and respectable speeds, were relegated to training and home defense, while the two Nagato and two Yamato class were being saved due to fuel limitations for a "decisive battle", which never came.
In fact, the only Japanese battleships to see much action in the early stages were the four Kongō-class battlecruisers, which served mostly as carrier escorts due to their high speed and antiaircraft armament.
Several USN ships were lost and others were crippled, but they inflicted critical damage on Hiei, which was abandoned after being subject to repeated air attacks that made salvage impossible.
The following evening, at the Second Naval Battle of Guadalcanal on 15 November 1942, the United States battleships South Dakota and Washington fought and defeated a bombardment force centered around Kirishima.
Although South Dakota was incapacitated early on by a faulty circuit breaker and suffered moderate damage, Washington's accurate radar-directed fire fatally crippled Kirishima.
[17] During the Soviet-Finnish Winter War, the Soviet battleships Marat and Oktyabrskaya Revolutsiya made several attempts to neutralize the Finnish coastal batteries to facilitate a full naval blockade.
[19] The dense German and Finnish minefields and the submarine nets effectively restricted Soviet traffic in the Gulf of Finland, forcing the larger vessels to remain at port.
The British HACS fire control system had been rendered inoperable by the extreme heat and humidity of the Malaya tropical climate, and the anti-aircraft artillery had managed to shoot down only a handful of attackers.
The space saved from combining the two types of guns added to simplification of supply, increased deck armor coverage, stowage of other equipment, more light anti-aircraft batteries, and other needs.
[23] The Japanese even used the "San Shiki" (the Beehive) Model 13 anti-aircraft shell for the main gun armament of the Yamato-class battleships, which would have in theory functioned as a super-sized "shotgun", though this was not considered a success.
[27] In the aftermath of the Battle of Jutland and post–World War I era, designers began drawing up armor schemes that protected against ordnance dropped by aircraft or submarines.
The five ships of the American Tennessee and Colorado classes had considerably improved underwater hull protection over previous battleships, as the result of extensive experimentation and testing.
A bow hit was deadly, since the onrushing water from the battleship's high speed could wrench the hole open wider and collapse compartment bulkheads, which was why Yamato's sister, Musashi, foundered at Sibuyan Sea.
[citation needed] Fleet Air Arm planned to release their armor-piercing bombs from above a certain height so they would penetrate Tirpitz's thick armor during Operation Tungsten.
For instance, the TDS in the South Dakota and Iowa-class battleships were designed to absorb the energy from an underwater explosion equivalent to 700 pounds (317 kg) of TNT — the Navy's best guess in the 1930s about Japanese weapons.
[citation needed] In a well-planned attack, fighter planes strafed the battleship to suppress the AA guns, while dive bombers used their armor-piercing bombs to cause topside damage and havoc.
[citation needed] Battleships were able to sustain more punishment and had fewer vulnerable spots than cruisers and carriers, so it was difficult to rely upon scoring a critical hit (the cases of the Bismarck and Prince of Wales are considered exceptional).
This notably occurred in the Battle of Leyte Gulf, when the super-dreadnought Musashi eventually succumbed to damage caused by waves of U.S. carrier aircraft in the Sibuyan Sea.
By contrast, the 24 October air attack on Nishimura's southern pincer did little damage, even though both of his Fusō-class battleships were slow World War I-era dreadnoughts and his force had far fewer screening ships, as he only faced a single wave from U.S. carriers Franklin and Enterprise.
Other more or less successful Italian methods included manned torpedoes and small motor assault boats, which were filled with explosives, aimed at the target, sped up to full speed, while the pilot catapulted himself out from the dashing craft.
The last active German battleship, Tirpitz, lurked until late into the war in Norwegian fjords protected by anti-submarine weapons and shore based anti-aircraft guns.
After several air strikes, including Operation Tungsten, which was made with carrier aircraft, Tirpitz was finally sunk in harbour by RAF heavy bombers carrying massive Tallboy bombs.
During that action, codenamed Operation Catechism, two of the bombs penetrated her armor, one holing her portside and the other starting a fire that eventually detonated her magazines and blew off her Caesar turret, causing her to capsize and killing 1,000 of the 1,700 men aboard.