With this and other wedges, the Israelis hoped to divide various units in the Egyptian army's expeditionary force in Palestine as part of Operation Yoav's plan.

The Beit Hanoun wedge as a tactic was unsuccessful, because the objective of dividing the Egyptian expeditionary force was not achieved, but it accomplished other strategic goals in Operation Yoav.

[2] Israel's military options were pondered by its leadership during the second truce, and the Bernadotte Plan prompted the government and army to decide to concentrate the next effort on the southern front.

[3] This was the approach favored by Yigal Allon, head of the Southern Command, which mostly won over the General Staff's proposals to directly assault the large Egyptian concentrations.

[3][5] Beit Hanoun was a Palestinian Arab village in southwestern Palestine, just northeast of Gaza, located on the coastal road.

[3] On the night of October 15, 1948, Israel sent a convoy to the Negev, hoping that the Egyptians would shoot at it and give the Israeli forces an excuse to start the operation.

The day after that, they evacuated their divisional staff from Majdal, under a smoke screen and heavy air and artillery barrage, using the alternative path created by the previous convoys.

This involved significant engineering work, and a makeshift road of wood and wire netting was laid on the shoreline, which trucks and armored vehicles were able to move through.

[6] On the other hand, it achieved a strategic goal—a significant number of Egyptian forces were allocated to fighting the Israelis in the wedge, which eased the other battles of Operation Yoav for Israel.

The Beit Hanoun wedge, however, created just enough of a panic for Egypt to start evacuating major forces, but prevented a situation where they would dig in and pose a significant obstacle.