[4] Brazil's rapid economic growth over the last decade has provoked a huge demand for new and stable sources of energy, especially to supply its growing industries.

However, there was opposition both within Brazil and among the international community to the project's potential construction regarding its economic viability, the generation efficiency of the dams and in particular its impacts on the region's people and environment.

On 26 August 2010, a contract was signed with Norte Energia to construct the dam once the Brazilian Institute of Environment and Renewable Natural Resources (IBAMA) had issued an installation license.

[10] Plans for what would eventually be called the Belo Monte Dam Complex began in 1975 during Brazil's military dictatorship, when Eletronorte contracted the Consórcio Nacional de Engenheiros Consultores (CNEC) to realize a hydrographic study to locate potential sites for a hydroelectric project on the Xingu River.

The encounter, symbolized by the indigenous woman leader Tuíra holding her machete against the face of then-engineer José Antonio Muniz Lopes sparked enormous repercussions both in Brazil and internationally over the plans for the six dams.

"[12] President of Eletronorte, José Muniz Lopes, in an interview with the newspaper O Liberal (Belo Monte entusiasma an Eletronorte por Sônia Zaghetto, 15 July 2001), affirmed: "Within the electric sector's planning for the period 2010/2020, we’re looking at three dams – Marabá (Tocantins river), Altamira (previously called Babaquara, Xingu River) and Itaituba (São Luís do Tapajós).

[citation needed] In 2008, another new environmental impact assessment was written, this time by Eletrobras with the participation of Odebrecht, Camargo Corrêa, and Andrade Gutierrez, which formally accepted Alternative C or the construction only of the Belo Monte dam itself.

[17][18] In April 2010, Odebrecht, Camargo Corrêa, and CPFL Energia dropped out of the project tender, arguing that the artificially low price of the auction (R$83/US$47) set by the government was not viable for economic returns on investment.

In April 2010 the Brazilian Federal Attorney General's Office suspended the project tender and annulled the provisional environmental license on claims of unconstitutionality.

[29] On 1 June 2011, IBAMA granted the full license to construct the dam after studies were carried out and the consortium agreed to pay $1.9 billion in costs to address social and environmental problems.

[33] President of a federal regional court Olindo Menezes overturned the decision on 3 March 2011 saying there was no need for all conditions to be met in order for preliminary work to begin.

[40][41] On 9 November, construction was allowed to recommence after federal judge Maria do Carmo Cardoso ruled that indigenous people did not have to be consulted by law before work approval.

It would create the Calha Do Xingu Reservoir which would have a normal capacity of 2,069,000,000 cubic metres (1,677,000 acre⋅ft) and surface area of 333 square kilometres (129 sq mi).

[22] Critics claim that the project would only make financial sense if the Brazilian government builds additional dam reservoirs upstream to guarantee a year-round flow of water, thus increasing the availability of generation.

Supporters of the project point out that the seasonal minimum flow of the Xingu river occurs at a time when other Brazilian hydro plants are well supplied,[citation needed] so that no additional dams would have to be built.

Reportedly, Brazil's National Council for Power Policies approved a resolution, previously sanctioned by then president Lula, that only one hydroelectric dam would be built on the Xingu.

Of particular note is the Altamira (Babaquara) Dam, which would flood an additional 6,140 square kilometres (2,370 sq mi) of reservoir, according to its original design.

In 2006, Conservation Strategy Fund (CSF) analyzed different cost-benefit scenarios for Belo Monte as an energy project, excluding environmental costs.

When simulating energy benefits using a modeling system it became obvious that Belo Monte would require additional upstream dams to provide water storage for dry season generation.

[65] Ex-director of ANEEL Afonso Henriques Moreira Santos stated that large dams such as Belo Monte were not necessary to meet the government's goal of 6% growth per year.

[66] However, a study by the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro, published in June 2011, criticised some of these alternative suggestions and defended the Belo Monte dam project.

[73] Two senior officials at IBAMA, Leozildo Tabajara da Silva Benjamin and Sebastião Custódio Pires, resigned their posts in 2009 citing high-level political pressure to approve the project.

[22] 140 organizations and movements from Brazil and across the globe decried the decision-making process in granting the environmental license for the dams in a letter to Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva in 2010.

[77] Dams in Brazil emit high amounts of methane, due to the lush jungle covered by waters each year as the basin fills.

On the other hand, the energy generated by the dam for the next 50 years, at an average of 4419 MW, is 1.14 bboe (billion barrels of oil equivalent)[citation needed].

Norte Energia have failed to obtain free, prior, and informed consent from the Juruna and Arara indigenous tribes to be impacted by Belo Monte.

[86][87][88] External researchers indicate that the majority of the Belo Monte dam's energy output will be relegated towards the aluminium industry, and will not benefit the people living in the area.

[12] However, Norte Energia released a clarification note stating their concern with the socioeconomic development of the area, including the promise to invest R$3.700 billion (1,300 million GBP) into various issues.

The government didn't hold constitutionally required meetings with indigenous communities affected by the dam before granting permission in 2005 to start with the construction.

Indigenous groups have questioned the government's actions over these events,[95] but their situation remains ignored by the authorities, as shown with the May 2011 Xingu Mission report of the CDDPH (Conselho de Defesa dos Direitos da Pessoa Humana),[96] of which several sections regarding accusations of human right violations were excluded by the Special Secretary for Human Rights, Maria do Rosário Nunes.