Bhāviveka
According to Xuanzang, Bhāviveka was a 6th-century scholar from south India (Andhra Pradesh) who traveled north in an attempt to engage in debate with the Yogacara master Dharmapāla (who refused to meet him).
Qvarnström argues that the need for this revision was that Madhyamaka was in danger of "being absorbed or overshadowed by the Yogacara school" and was also coming under pressure from various Brahmanical systems of philosophy.
Qvarnström writes that "in order to avert these threats and to bring Madhyamaka philosophy into conformity with the prevalent philosophical requirements of the intellectual milieu in the sixth century, Bhavya used logical devices originally formulated by Dignaga and others.
[13] According to Ames (1993: p. 210), Bhāviveka was one of the first Buddhist logicians to employ the "formal syllogism" (Wylie: sbyor ba'i tshig, Sanskrit: prayogavākya) of Indian logic in expounding mādhyamaka.
Qvarnström outlines Bhāviveka's development of madhyamaka as follows:[3]According to Bhavya, the refutation of a system by depicting its inherent contradictions without stating a positive thesis of one's own was not sufficient to settle a debate.
This "reductio ad absurdum" (prāsaṇgika) argumentation had to be supplemented by independent propositions (svatantra), sometimes incorporated in formal syllogisms (prayogavākya).
By means of independent inferences (svatantrānumāna) and proper syllogisms, Bhavya considered himself capable of both proving the validity of his own propositions and of refuting any upcoming counterposition, Buddhist or Hindu.Bhāviveka held that even though Nagarjuna himself had only relied on prāsaṇgika style reductios which do not put forth any positive thesis (and only refutes the arguments of the opponent), it was the responsibility of the commentator to make explicit the implications and logical consequences of Nagarjuna's text.
By making this logical transformation, Bhaviveka takes an argument that reduces the opponent's assertion to an absurd conclusion (prasaṇga) and substitutes an independent (svatantra) inference, with a proper thesis (pratijñā), reason (hetu), and example (dṛṣṭānta).
[20] Eckel notes that his defense of positive syllogisms may have been motivated by its importance in the sixth century Indian circles of formal debate.
In these circles, the practice of merely attacking the views of one's opponent without defending a thesis of one's own (which was called vitaṇḍā) was seen as bad form and not well respected.
However, according to Bhāviveka, reason (tarka) does have a role in the Buddhist path and that is the removal of wrong and confused views about reality which block one's spiritual progress.
"[22] Furthermore, inference allows one to examine all the differences which are found among the various spiritual traditions and philosophies (darśana), and then to be able to determine which is true in a rational manner.
According to Qvarnström, Bhavya's Madhyamakahrdayakārikā and its Tarkajvālā commentary is one of the earliest sources on early (pre-Shankara) Vedanta (aside from the Brahmasūtra, the Vākyapadīya and the Gaudapādīyakārikā).
Bhavya consequently considers it his duty not only to refute the Vedanta interpretation of this notion, but also to outline his own view on this matter at great length.
Bhavya may thus be said to have initiated on a systematical basis the main issue of the prolonged controversies between Buddhist and Brahmanical philosophy which were to continue well beyond his time.Bhāviveka wrote an independent work on the Madhyamaka entitled the Madhyamakahrdayakārikā (MHK, Verses on the Heart of the Middle Way) which Bhavya in turn wrote an autocommentary upon entitled the Tarkajvālā (Blaze of Reasoning).
[31] Bhāviveka's Madhyamakahrdayakārikā and his commentary Tarkajvālā therein, states (Malcolm) David Eckel, provide a "unique and authoritative account of the intellectual differences that stirred the Buddhist community in this creative period".
[14] The Sanskrit is no longer extant (except for a few embedded quotations in the Prasannapadā,[38] Candrakīrti's commentary of the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā and critique of the Prajñāpradīpa) but according to Ames (1993: p. 211) is available in both an excellent Tibetan translation, rendered by Jñānagarbha and Cog ro Klu'i rgyal mtshan (Wylie) in the early 9th century.
