[9] Allied intelligence also indicated that the German aircraft industry was capable of producing about 2,000–3,000 planes per month, so the need to diminish the enemy's manufacturing potential soon was evident.

[10] Prior to Big Week, throughout 1943, the US 8th Air Force had been growing in size and experience and started pressing attacks deeper into Germany.

[11] However, the Luftwaffe reacted by sending more planes armed with heavier weaponry to oppose the raids, with increasing success, as evidenced by the example of the two Schweinfurt-Regensburg missions.

The self-defense concept appeared flawed enough, and losses among the bombers deemed unsustainable: daylight missions into Germany were canceled in order to rebuild the forces and find new tactics to fend off German fighters.

[1][16] This would then allow Allied air superiority over the Luftwaffe to be achieved, which was considered absolutely critical in advance of the upcoming invasion of Northern France.

[1][9][17] Brinkhuis (1984) contended that the operation's target was attacking Germany's aircraft industry,[9] 'going back to a plan that had already been made in October 1943.

'[18] 'The manufacture of these [fighters, such as Messerschmitt 109, 110, and the Focke-Wulf 190], saw such a steep rise that the USAAF and RAF had good reason to fear that the defense of Hitler's Festung Europa with all these aircraft would lead to a horrible massacre amongst Allied flight crews.

[18] As such a situation was extremely rare, leadership decided to launch the campaign anyway as soon as the forecast showed the smallest signs of acceptable flying weather.

Recognizing these problems, Major General Jimmy Doolittle, commander of Eighth Air Force from the end of 1943, ordered bombing missions of key aircraft factories that the Luftwaffe could not ignore.

In effect, the primary purpose of the bombing missions was to bring up the Luftwaffe and the real role of the Allied bombers was to be used and sacrificed as bait.

In this war of attrition, the number of trained and experienced pilots proved the most decisive factor, though, rather than the availability of fighter aircraft.

[22] The Americans flew continuously escorted missions against airframe manufacturing and assembly plants and other targets in numerous German cities including: Leipzig, Brunswick, Gotha, Regensburg, Schweinfurt, Augsburg, Stuttgart and Steyr.

Mission 230: "Big Week" continues with 799 aircraft dispatched against German aviation and Luftwaffe airfields; 41 bombers and 11 fighters are lost.

Mission 236: 5 of 5 B-17s drop 250 bundles of leaflets on Grenoble, Toulouse, Chartres, Caen and Raismes, France at 2129–2335 hours without loss.

[5] In contrast to the raids of the previous year, the US losses were replaceable, while the Germans were already hard pressed due to the war in the East.

[citation needed] The lack of skilled pilots due to an attrition in the three-front war was the factor eroding the capability of the Jagdwaffe.

[34] According to McFarland & Newton (1991), the purported Allied strategy of sacrificing bombers in order to lure and kill Luftwaffe fighters was very effective.

[41] In London, a diplomatic incident occurred between the American, British and Dutch military and civilian commanders and officials about what had happened, who should be granted access to which information, and in which order, and who should ultimately be held responsible, creating distrust within the Allied leadership for some time.

[41] The American military command was relatively late in drawing lessons from the disorderly air raid, which had struck an ally's civilian population hard.

[38] Nazi German propaganda attempted to exploit the tragedy in order to counter pro-Allied sympathies amongst the Dutch civilian population, but these efforts appear to have been ineffective, and perhaps even counterproductive.

[42] The tragic failures of the 22 February bombings of Dutch cities no one had ever heard of, which had resulted in almost a thousand civilian casualties and major infrastructural damage, were initially brushed off as an 'incident', and Operation Argument would be glorified as 'Big Week' in Allied historiography.

[43][better source needed] The new German tactics of using Sturmböcke (heavily armed Fw 190s) as bomber destroyers and Bf 109Gs to escort them in Gefechtsverband formations, were proving somewhat effective.

[citation needed] The Combined Bomber Offensive attacks against fighter production officially ended on 1 April 1944, and control of the air forces passed to US General Dwight D. Eisenhower in preparation for the invasion of France.

The combined heavy bomber forces were now used in the Transport Plan destroying railway supply lines to and within France to reduce German capacity to respond to invasion on the French coast.

Russell (1999) stated: "While they continued strategic bombing, the USAAF turned its attention to the tactical air battle in support of the Normandy invasion".

[43][better source needed] According to Kenneth P. Werell (1986), the battle for air superiority was very costly for both sides, but by 1 April 1944, the Allies had gained the upper hand.