[citation needed] A poorly organized, local Bosniak Patriotic League paramilitary group had been established in response to the Bosnian Serb proclamation.

Professor Michael Sells of the University of Chicago concluded that they were carried out to erase the cultural history of the Bosniak people of Bijeljina.

Around 3 April, Serb forces removed the bodies of those massacred in anticipation of the arrival of a Bosnian government delegation tasked with investigating what had transpired.

Republika Srpska leaders Biljana Plavšić and Momčilo Krajišnik were convicted for the deportations and forcible transfers in the ethnic cleansing that followed the massacre.

[16] The SDS, claiming that independence would result in the Serbs becoming "a national minority in an Islamic state",[17] had used armed irregular units to block the delivery of ballot boxes, and dropped leaflets encouraging the boycott.

"[20] Bijeljina was strategically significant because of its location, which enabled the easy movement of military personnel, weaponry, and goods into Posavina and the Bosnian Krajina where Serb forces were gathered.

[21] Željko Ražnatović ("Arkan"), leader of the Serb Volunteer Guard (SDG), spent a month in Bijeljina devising battle plans prior to the attack.

[22] Fighting broke out in Bijeljina on 1 April, after local Serbs and SDG personnel threw grenades into shops,[3] including a Bosniak-owned cafe,[4] provoking the poorly organized Patriotic League into an armed conflict.

[27] Meeting little resistance,[28] the SDG, under JNA command[2][need quotation to verify] and reporting directly to Serbian President Slobodan Milošević,[29] swiftly captured Bijeljina.

[33] Together with the SDG, they began a campaign of violence against local Bosniaks and some of the Serb population, committing several rapes and murders, and searching residents' houses and pillaging their property.

[2] At Karadžić's trial, the former Mayor of Bijeljina Cvijetin Simić, testified that the only real fighting that took place in the town on 1–2 April happened around the city hospital, where the most fatalities occurred.

[24] This pattern was described by the United Nations Commission of Experts in the following terms:[36] First, Bosnian Serb paramilitary forces, often with the assistance of the JNA, seize control of the area.

Many have been forced to sign documents relinquishing their rights to their homes before being deported to other areas of the country.The exact number killed in the takeover is unknown.

[43] An investigation by the ICTY later stated that the victims had been shot "in the chest, mouth, temple, or back of the head, some at close range" and that none had been wearing military uniforms.

[43] The acts against civilians in Bijeljina and those carried out by the JNA and special forces that followed were an attempt to intimidate and sidetrack the Bosnian government and general public from pursuing independence.

[4] Serb forces ordered the removal of the bodies of those killed, in anticipation of a delegation of high-ranking Bosnian officials due to arrive on 4 April.

[41] Serb flags were mounted on two mosques in Bijeljina,[49] and checkpoints and roadblocks were established, preventing journalists and European monitors from entering.

"[48] General Sava Janković, commander of the JNA's 17th Corps, reported that:[52] A big influence of the SDS and Arkan's propaganda is felt in the 38th [Partisan Division] and the 17th [Mixed Artillery Regiment], because of which some [conscripts] have left their units with arms. ...

A team from the BH Presidency led by Fikret Abdić, Biljana Plavšić, the chief-of-staff of the 2nd Military District and the commander of the 17th Corps, has been in Bijeljina barracks since 1200 hours.

"[52] On the same day, Bosnian Defense Minister Ejup Ganić and Croat members of the coalition government urged Izetbegović to mobilize the TORBiH[26] due to the inability of the JNA to stop the violence.

[58] The SDS in Bijeljina put forth a plan and proposed that a Bosniak family be killed "on each side of town to create an atmosphere of fear".

[57] On 23 September 1992, the SDG and Mirko's Chetniks handed over control of Bijeljina to the SDS[4] and the plan was carried out by Duško Malović's special police unit.

In 2008, Branko Todorović, the President of the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Bijeljina, criticized the "lethargic" and "unacceptable behavior" of the Republika Srpska judiciary.

[78] In 1999, Milošević was indicted for carrying out a genocidal campaign that included Bijeljina and other locations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, among other charges, but he died mid-trial in March 2006.

[79] In February 2000, Plavšić and Momčilo Krajišnik, the speaker of the National Assembly of Republika Srpska, were indicted for the same genocidal campaign in Bosnia and Herzegovina, among other charges.

[86][87] The Tribunal concluded: [Stanišić and Simatović] shared the intent to further the common criminal plan to forcibly and permanently remove the majority of non-Serbs from large areas of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina.

[90] The Research and Documentation Center in Sarajevo has recorded a total of 1,078 fatalities in the Bijeljina municipality during the war, including approximately 250 civilians of all ethnicities.

Many faced difficulties in returning to their homes including discrimination from the police, being unable to receive an identification card, or reconnect their phone lines.

A number of factors have been cited as contributing to its failure, such as the inclusion of the commander of the Batković concentration camp in its delegation, its limited legal standing, disputes over the commission's scope, and poor funding.

[94] Local Serbs celebrate 1 April as "City Defense Day",[95][dead link‍][96] and a street in the town is presently named after the Serbian Volunteer Guard.