In Chastleton Corp v. Sinclair,[2] despite the language being the same, the statute was unanimously struck down in a decision where the Court held that the emergency necessitating the measure had passed, and that that which "justified interference with ordinarily existing property rights as of 1919 had come to an end by 1922.

This shortage impelled federal intervention in the housing market, and in October 1919, Congress passed a statute establishing a commission with the power to regulate rental property in the District of Columbia.

Holmes noted that state control of privately owned buildings evoked a peculiar apprehension, but nonetheless was within regulatory reach: The fact that tangible property is also visible tends to give a rigidity to our conception of our rights in it that we do not attach to others less concretely clothed.

It is enough that we are not warranted in saying that legislation that has been resorted to for the same purpose all over the world is futile or has no reasonable relation to the relief sought.Justice Joseph McKenna wrote a sharply worded dissent.

The constitutional prohibitions on denial of due process and impairment of the obligation of contracts were "so direct and definite as to need no reinforcing words", and the only question was whether the statute fell within the purview of these limitations.

McKenna dismissed the claim of wartime necessity, stating that "the country has had other wars with resulting embarrassments, yet they did not induce the relaxation of constitutional requirements nor the exercise of arbitrary power."

May they too be taken from the direction of their owners and disposed of by the Government?In light of this danger, legislative judgement should not be accorded determinative weight: "It is to be remembered that the legality of power must be estimated not by what it will do, but by what it can do."

In Chastleton Corp v. Sinclair, the Court held that the emergency necessitating the measure had passed, and that that which "justified interference with ordinarily existing property rights as of 1919 had come to an end by 1922.