Boeing 737 MAX certification

Boeing wanted the FAA to certify the airplane as another version of the long-established 737; this would limit the need for additional training of pilots, a major cost saving for airline customers.

[6] In September 2020, the House of Representatives concluded its investigation and cited numerous instances where Boeing dismissed employee concerns with MCAS, prioritized deadline and budget constraints over safety, and where it lacked transparency in disclosing essential information to the FAA.

Boeing's goal was to ensure the 737 MAX would not need a new type rating, which would require significant additional pilot training, adding unacceptably to the overall cost of the airplane for customers.

[27] Chief executive Dai Whittingham of the independent trade group UK Flight Safety Committee disputed the idea that the MAX was just another 737, saying, "It is a different body and aircraft but certifiers gave it the same type rating.

"[47][48] On May 17, 2019, after discovering 737 MAX flight simulators could not adequately replicate MCAS activation,[49] Boeing corrected the software to improve the force feedback of the manual trim wheel and to ensure realism.

[65] According to The Seattle Times, Boeing convinced the FAA, during MAX certification in 2014, to grant exceptions to federal crew alerting regulations, specifically relating to the "suppression of false, unnecessary" information.

Just over a year later, on December 11, 2019, the US House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure released the study and described its conclusion by stating, "if left uncorrected, the MCAS design flaw in the 737 Max could result in as many as 15 future fatal crashes over the life of the fleet".

[87] Documentation made public at the House hearing on October 30, 2019, "established that Boeing was also already well aware, before the Lion Air accident, that if a pilot did not react to unintended MCAS activation within 10 seconds, the result could be catastrophic.

[114][115][36] On October 25, 2019, Peter DeFazio commented the Lion Air accident report, saying "And I will be introducing legislation at the appropriate time to ensure that unairworthy commercial airliners no longer slip through our regulatory system".

"[117][118] On July 17, representatives of crash victims' families, in testimony to the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee – Aviation Subcommittee, called on regulators to re-certificate the MAX as a completely new aircraft.

They also called for wider reforms to the certification process, and asked the committee to grant protective subpoenas so that whistle-blowers could testify even if they had agreed to a gag order as a condition of a settlement with Boeing.

[119] In a July 31 senate hearing, the FAA defended its administrative actions following the Lion Air accident, noting that standard protocol in ongoing crash investigations limited the information that could be provided in the airworthiness directive.

"[135]In January 2020, Kansas Rep. Sharice Davids, member of the House Transportation Committee and is vice chair of its aviation subcommittee, said: "The newly released messages from Boeing employees are incredibly disturbing and show a coordinated effort inside the company to deceive the American public and federal regulators, who are in place to keep passengers safe.

[...] In addition to the public safety concerns these messages raise, Boeing's callousness has now cost thousands of Kansans their livelihood and endangered the economy of our state, which is dependent on aerospace.

In a preliminary summary of its nearly yearlong investigation, the committee said multiple factors had led to the crashes, but focused on the MCAS, which Boeing had failed to classify as safety critical, part of a strategy designed to avoid closer scrutiny by regulators as the company developed the plane.

In a letter to President Trump, the OSC found that 16 of 22 FAA pilots conducting safety reviews, some of them assigned to the MAX two years ago, "lacked proper training and accreditation.

[145] Special Counsel Henry J. Kerner wrote in the letter to the President, "This information specifically concerns the 737 Max and casts serious doubt on the FAA's public statements regarding the competency of agency inspectors who approved pilot qualifications for this aircraft".

[146] In September, Daniel Elwell disputed the conclusions of the OSC, which found that aviation safety inspectors (ASIs) assigned to the 737 MAX certifications did not meet training requirements.

[154] At the request of Peter DeFazio, and Chair of the Subcommittee on Aviation Rick Larsen, the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) Inspector General opened an investigation into FAA approval of the Boeing 737 MAX aircraft series, focusing on potential failures in the safety-review and certification process.

In a memo and a video dated November 14, FAA's Steve Dickson instructed his staff to "take whatever time is needed" in their review, repeating that approval is "not guided by a calendar or schedule.

Operational validation, including assessment of Boeing's training proposals by international and U.S. crews, as well as by the FAA administrator and his deputy in person, will then proceed, followed by documentation steps.

Due to the global scrutiny following the two fatal accidents, the FAA is re-evaluating its certification process and seeking consensus with other regulators to approve the return to service to avoid suspicion of undue cooperation with Boeing.

The FAA also indicated that non-U.S.-registered MAX aircraft would not be allowed access to U.S. airspace if the aviation authority of the state of registration does not require compliance with the amended design or "an alternative that achieves at least an equivalent level of safety", pursuant to Article 33 of the ICAO Chicago Convention.

[249] In addition to system analysis mentioned above, EASA raised concerns with the autopilot not engaging or disengaging upon request, or that the manual trim wheel is electronically counteracted upon, or requires substantial physical force to overcome the aerodynamic effects in flight.

[262] On October 4, 2019, the head of civil aviation for Transport Canada, said that global regulators are considering the requirements for the 737 MAX to fly again, weighing in the "startle factors" that can overwhelm pilots lacking sufficient exposure in simulation scenarios.

[264] On August 20, 2020, Transport Canada announced that it would be conducting its own flight tests the following week, as part of its independent review aimed at validating key areas of the FAA certification.

[citation needed] Following the FAA's clearance to resume flights in the U.S., Transport Canada indicated that its own recertification process was ongoing, and that it intends to mandate additional pre-flight and in-flight procedures as well as differences in pilot training requirements.

[277] According to the first Brazilian government statement on the MAX issue, the National Civil Aviation Agency of Brazil (ANAC) had been working closely with the FAA on getting the airplane back into service by the end of 2019.

[280] Boeing initially hoped that flights could resume by July 2019;[citation needed] by June 3, Muilenburg expected to have the planes flying by the end of 2019 but declined to provide a timeline.

[301][302][303] By July 2022, as it had about 640 orders, Boeing CEO David Calhoun thought the 737-10 could be cancelled as it had a certification deadline by 2022 year-end before requiring adding a crew alerting system, leading to lower 737 commonality, unless a waiver is granted, a political decision of the US Congress.