[citation needed] There he engaged the services of several thousand foreign soldiers and officers, mostly British and Irish, set up his capital at Angostura (now Ciudad Bolívar) and established liaisons with the revolutionary forces of the Llanos.

Bolívar defeated him at the Battle of Las Queseras del Medio in April, forcing Morillo to retreat to Calabozo, where he would stay to wait out the rain season.

[4] The man for the job would be none other than Colonel Francisco de Paula Santander, who Bolivar had just promoted to Brigadier General on August 12, this would be followed by naming him Commander of the Vanguard of the Liberator Army of New Granada and dispatching him to the Llanos of the Casanare Province along with 1,200 muskets, uniforms, and other supplies, with the mission of creating and training a New Granadan army for a future campaign to liberate New Granada.

[11] By early 1818, artillery Colonel José María Barreiro was the military commander of all royalist troops in New Granada, and counted with at least 4,500 trained soldiers of the III Division of the Expeditionary Army of Costa Firme scattered throughout the Kingdom.

[citation needed] If Bolívar could liberate New Granada, he would have a whole new base from which to operate against General Pablo Morillo, head of the royalist forces in the area and end the stalemate in Venezuela.

[citation needed] Central New Granada held great promise since, unlike Venezuela, it had only been recently conquered by Morillo and it had a prior six-year experience of independent government.

[citation needed] To surprise it, Bolívar's proposed plan would be to move during the rainy season, when the Llanos flooded up to a meter which usually forced both sides to their winter quarters, and penetrate Central New Granada by crossing the Cordillera Oriental at the Salina pass through the Tunja Province and from there and march on the capital Santa Fe.

[20] The pass through the Paramo de Pisba was the shortest and the least defended route, however it was also the most difficult and treacherous but with the greatest chance of surprising Spanish forces as it was deemed impassable by Barreiro especially during the rainy season.

Doubts began to arise amongst some of the Venezuelan troops and officers (apart from Bolivar) about the feasibility of the campaign, due to the lack of sufficient clothing and supplies for the difficult mountain crossing.

[29] Santander also countered Bolívar by saying that crossing the Andes through Cucuta would take far longer and that they would lose their element of surprise, allowing Barreiro to receive reinforcements from Venezuela.

[30] As the army ascended from the hot and humid, flood-swept plains of Venezuela of New Granada they were greeted by the freezing cold of the icy mountain pass of the Páramo de Pisba, which reached an elevation of 3,960 meters (13,000 feet), through the Cordillera Oriental.

After the hardships of wading through a virtual sea,[tone] the mostly llanero army was not prepared and poorly clothed for the cold and altitude of the mountains as well as the heavy rainfall they experienced.

Bolivar, who was with them, described the crossing: "That same day we entered the Paramo, while the weather was good, the troops suffered a lot from the cold and we lost all beasts of saddle and burden; It has been rare that one would make it.

He then considered several paths through which Bolívar could cross the mountains: La Salina, Paya (Pisba), Pueblo Viejo, Medina, Miraflores, Tenza valley and Cáqueza.

[44] Barreiro soon found himself in a difficult situation: he did not dare to cross the mountain range and attack Bolívar, because he feared opening any other passage for him on a front that extended almost 250 kilometers.

When Bolívar arrived in Socha on July 6 his army was in a weakened state and at its most vulnerable, however Barreiro preferred to stay garrisoned in Tunja in order to concentrate his forces that had been dispersed throughout the province.

On July 7 this vanguard force engaged in small skirmishes with patrolling Royalist squads dispatched from Sogamoso by the local Spanish commander Lieutenant Colonel Francisco Gonzalez.

In the direction of Corrales he dispatched 30 men under the command of Lieutenant Manuel Gutierrez and to Gameza a company of grenadiers of the King's 1st Battalion as well as some dragoons numbering 200.

As a result of these circumstances Barreiro advanced along the banks of the Chicamocha River setting his headquarters in a place known as Topaga Mills, once there he sent reinforcements in order to support his forces near Corrales and Gameza.

[56][57] After the results of the Battle of Gameza, Bolivar changed his strategy disregarding his initial plan for a frontal assault on Sogamoso and instead opting for a flanking maneuver through Cerinza Valley.

Bolivar now at full strength, still aimed to reach the capital Santa Fe through the main Camino Real, however he would need to cross the swollen Chicamocha River in order to do this.

Barreiro moved quickly to place his troops on favorable ground on top of Picacho and Cangrejo hills in an area near Vargas Swamp that served as a chokepoint between the Salitre to Paipa road arriving there at 11am.

Bolivar in an act of desperation committed his reserve cavalry under the command of Colonel Juan José Rondón who led an uphill charge with 14 lancers that managed to penetrate the Spanish line on Cangrejo Hill.

Colonel Lucas Carvajal also charged with his cavalry squadron in support of Rondón, concentrating his attack on the main road where Hussars of Ferdinand VII had been advancing along.[60].

[64] Barreiro now needed take the fastest route to Santa Fe, he hoped to fool the Patriots by conducting a night march in the rain around Tunja through the towns of Combita and Motavita, the arduous march was conducted the same day August 5 with the Royalist Army arriving in Motavita during the early hours of August 6. the Royalists believed they had moved undetected.

The III Division was effectively dismantled at the Battle of Boyaca with only a small group of soldiers and officers, the most notable being Barreiro's chief-of-staff Colonel Sebastian Diaz, who were able to flee and avoid being captured or killed.

Samano and the rest of royalist government fled the capital in the direction of Honda where they would take the Magdalena River up to Cartagena de Indias the very next morning, leaving behind the treasury.

The 400 troops belonging to the Aragon Battalion under the command of Colonel Sebastian de la Calzada also left the capital in the direction towards Popayan but not before destroying the gunpowder supply in the city.

[citation needed] Despite the royalists' strength in the other provinces of the region, such as Santa Marta and Pasto – where resistance withstood various years of revolutionary uprisings – the capital of the viceroyalty of New Granada had fallen into the hands of the Patriots.

[71][72][73] Bolívar continued his efforts against the royalist areas of Venezuela, culminating in the Battle of Carabobo two years later, which all but secured his control of northern South America.