According to Japanese historian Hiroyuki Shindo: "...the major causes of this low operational rate were widespread illness among the aircrews, along with ... the lack of aircraft replacements.

[3] Allied personnel started construction of two dummy airfields, relatively close to Japanese infantry positions on the Huon Peninsula, north of Lae.

[3] (However, the Australian official history says the new, secret base was the separate airfield at nearby Marilinan, 40 mi (35 nmi; 64 km) from Lae.

[2] On 17 August, 47 B-24 Liberators and B-17 Flying Fortresses made a pre-dawn attack on the main base at Wewak and satellite airfields at Boram, Dagua and But.

Their New Guinea airbases were inadequate in terms of the concealment of planes, in hangars and other shelters, and they relied almost completely on a visual warning system, which did not allow enough time for aircraft on the ground to take off or be taken under cover.

These problems were compounded by the poor quality of runways,[2] a shortage of maintenance staff and a lack of heavy equipment at forward bases.

[7] Colonel Kazuo Tanikawa—an Eighth Area Army staff officer—later said: At the time of the air attacks on Wewak on 17 and 18 August our defences were not alert.

Consequently our air power was rapidly diminishing and was unable to aid our ground forces effectively which, in the end, constituted one of our chief reasons for losing the war.

The final aerial victories of the New Guinea campaign for the USAAF and Royal Australian Air Force occurred in June 1944.