Brazil–United States relations during the João Goulart government
Internationally, the Brazilian government continued its Independent Foreign Policy [pt], expanding its ties outside the Western bloc and disagreeing in part with the American proposals against Cuba.
In Latin America, it tried to influence leftist governments through economic assistance from the Alliance for Progress or to favor their overthrow by local opposition, thus tolerating several military coups.
Even if typically perceived as more moderate in foreign policy than the Republican Party, it was aggressive at the time, especially due to the great influence of conservative and militaristic representatives from the American South.
[17] In 1961 the military attempt to change the regime in Cuba, the Bay of Pigs invasion, failed,[18] while Fidel Castro announced the implementation of socialism[19] and his county's alignment with the Soviets.
[16] In 1962 the Cuban Missile Crisis tipped the balance of power in the region in favor of the United States, which allowed pressure to be put on reluctant countries such as Brazil.
[31] However, not all anti-communist right-wingers accepted issues such as land reform in Latin America, and so the U.S. acted against right-wing dictators Rafael Trujillo in the Dominican Republic and François Duvalier in Haiti.
[34] Further, the stated goal of supporting democratic regimes failed, and the U.S. government used political, economic, and military tools to destabilize leftist rulers elected within democracy.
"[6] Military coups occurred in Argentina and Peru in 1962, and in Guatemala and Ecuador in 1963, and in all of them the U.S. attitude moved from near-reaction (even stopping economic assistance) to expectation, and finally acceptance of the newly installed authoritarian regimes.
[45] Obtaining these loans had obstacles: the American Congress wanted economic stabilization measures demanded by the IMF as a counterpart, and the Brazilian Independent Foreign Policy (PEI) was unwanted in Washington.
The State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research disagreed with this reasoning and concluded that Goulart only intended to complete his term and hand over power to his elected successor.
[58][59] The diplomats had an image based both on well-established interpretations of reality and on stereotypes also common among Brazilians, such as "cordiality [pt]" and "jeitinho"; they even conceived negative traits such as laziness and corruption.
[65] Jango visited the United States in April 1962, where he established a good personal relationship with Kennedy, gave speeches at the OAS and in Congress, and attracted positive attention in the press.
[81] For the White House, Brazil was approaching the Non-Aligned Movement, expanding its political relations with the Soviet bloc and, in international forums, testing the limits of its relationship and tending towards neutralism.
[57] Thus the private lobby against the Brazilian government was stirred by the law limiting profit remittances and cases of expropriation of American companies by Leonel Brizola, governor of Rio Grande do Sul.
[102] The pressure exerted by Minister of Finance Walter Moreira Salles,[103] Kennedy's desire not to give the impression of being a deal breaker,[101] Goulart's weakened position within the parliamentary system, his political moderation and the importance of Brazil explain the continuity of American support at the beginning of his government.
The justification was the macroeconomic deterioration (public and external deficits and inflation were out of control) but there was the important political issue: the prospect was the end of parliamentarianism [pt], with Goulart gaining freedom of action.
It produced a report proposing to cut all aid, leading to the country's economic deterioration, followed by Goulart's turn to the left, and ultimately his overthrow by the military.
The debate continued and in mid-November Dean Rusk informed Gordon of the State Department's conclusions: there would be no major assistance to cover the Brazilian balance of payments deficit, but there would be minor support as long as Goulart made concessions.
[117] From June to August 1962, while the "step-by-step" policy to reorient Goulart through loans was being implemented, the U.S. government decided to support "democratic" candidates in the October elections, direct Alliance for Progress funds to favorable governors, and organize a pro-U.S. faction among the military.
[108] Jango was the target of a destabilization campaign; according to historian Stephen Rabe, Kennedy's effort against Fidel Castro, João Goulart and Cheddi Jagan "had no precedent in the history of inter-American relations".
Leftist Miguel Arraes won the government of Pernambuco, the political and economic center of the region, even with IBAD's support for the candidacy of his opponent João Cleofas [pt].
[130] The decision in mid-1962 to support favorable governors was executed by redirecting Alliance for Progress funds to their states, which Lincoln Gordon would later call "islands of administrative sanity.
José Paulo Netto[m] and Flávio Tavares [pt][n] have similar reasoning and placed the decisive moment in 1962, respectively in the OAS conference in January or in the Gordon-Kennedy meeting in July.
The document mentions the inauguration of Ranieri Mazzili, president of the Chamber of Deputies, until a presidential election within 30 days, a temporary military control [pt] and a friendly relationship at the very beginning of the new regime.
[s] It notes the deterioration of the national political-economic crisis and Lincoln Gordon's political assessments as "Peronist-like maneuvers" by the president and the possible installation of a regime contrary to American interests.
[164][165] In a telegram dated March 27, the ambassador noted the strength of Castelo Branco's group in the officialdom, the imminence of an action, and the possible lack of arms or fuel, suggesting a clandestine delivery of armaments by submarine to the coast of São Paulo.
The next day, the Executive Committee of the National Security Council considered the submarine proposal meaningless (the delivery would be too small) and also criticized sending the squadron, but agreed with the fuel supply.
[166][167][168][169] On the 30th, the CIA reported an imminent "revolution by anti-Goulart forces" in the coming days, with troops from São Paulo and Minas Gerais marching toward Rio de Janeiro to meet with allies there.
[174][175] According to Elio Gaspari, this warning was one of the factors in Goulart's decision to leave Rio de Janeiro for Brasília, precipitating the collapse of his military scheme in the First Army.
[179] The CIA reported that Jango had left Porto Alegre for Montevideo, Uruguay, at 1:00 PM;[180] He was actually in the interior of Rio Grande do Sul, and only arrived in the Uruguayan capital on the 4th.
