British Air Forces in France

[3] The AASF consisted of RAF light bomber squadrons, based around Rheims to be within range of the Ruhr, should the political decision be taken to begin strategic bombing.

The operational instructions issued by BAFF had stated that Bomber aircraft have proved extremely useful in support of an advancing army, especially against weak anti-aircraft resistance, but it is not clear that a bomber force used against an advancing army well supported by all forms of anti-aircraft defence and a large force of fighter aircraft, will be economically effective.

[9] The War Cabinet meeting that evening were warned by the Chief of Air Staff Cyril Newall that the bomber losses had been disproportionate to the results achieved.

At the request of BAFF and the BEF, the equivalent of another two squadrons joined the Air Component on 13 May but this was only after much discussion by the Chiefs of Staff Committee and the War Cabinet.

[11] The Chiefs of Staff Committee, meeting in the morning had advised that no further air support could be given on the Continent without unduly weakening the defence of Britain.

Paul Reynaud said the Allies had to choose between two risks, leaving English factories without fighter protection, like the French ones or seeing the Germans continue to advance on Paris.

It would not be good historically if their requests were denied, and their ruin resulted...The War Cabinet, faced with this, agreed to the French demand.

Of the 261 fighters that had operated with the component, only 66 returned to England; 120 of the lost aircraft had suffered damage which under normal circumstances would have been repairable.

[22] The provision of further reinforcements was discussed at the highest political levels, referred to by Churchill in his "This was their finest hour" speech of 18 June, During the great battle in France, we gave very powerful and continuous aid to the French Army both by fighters and bombers, but in spite of every kind of pressure we never would allow the entire Metropolitan strength of the Air Force, in fighters, to be consumed.

The battle was lost by the unfortunate strategical opening, by the extraordinary and unforeseen power of the armoured columns, and by the great preponderance of the German Army in numbers.

Our fighter Air Force might easily have been exhausted as a mere accident in that great struggle, and we should have found ourselves at the present time in a very serious plight.

[26][i] Sinclair countered that Fighter Command needed to recover its efficiency as well as its numerical strength; the squadrons were greatly disorganised and many of their finest leaders had been lost; Churchill did not press the matter further.

An unknown number of them were lost off St Nazaire on 17 June, when the troopship HMT Lancastria was bombed and sunk by the Luftwaffe.