The brigade was transferred out of the front in mid-April 1943 and left to rejoin the rest of the 1st Airborne Division to train for Operation Husky, the Allied invasion of Sicily.

[4] The British airborne establishment began development on 22 June 1940, when the Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, directed the War Office in a memorandum to investigate the possibility of creating a corps of 5,000 parachute troops.

[11] Shortly after the operation had been conducted, a memorandum was circulated through the War Office by the Chiefs of Staff of the Army and Royal Air Force requiring that No.

[12][13] In July, after a period of discussion about the problems of creating such a formation, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff authorised the raising of a brigade headquarters, 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th Parachute Battalions and an air troop of sappers from the Royal Engineers.

[18] In mid September, as the division was coming close to reaching full strength, Browning was informed that Operation Torch, the Allied invasion of North Africa, would take place in November.

A practice drop was conducted with a unit from the brigade on 9 October, although a lack of American familiarity with British airborne equipment and parachuting technique, as well a lack of British familiarity with the Dakota, led to three men being killed; this meant a delay in training whilst new techniques were developed, which in turn resulted in the majority of the brigade's personnel travelling to North Africa without having conducted a training drop from a Dakota.

[25] The planning was completed by 16:30, and at 20:00 the American pilots were briefed on the operation, which was briefly interrupted when a German aircraft flew over the area and dropped a stick of bombs.

6 Commando had secured Bône, a number of Oerlikon anti aircraft guns were salvaged from sunken vessels in the port's harbour, and these, in combination with a squadron of Spitfires that arrived on the evening of 11 November, were used to fend off future attacks.

[27] With this ambitious plan cancelled, on 14 November First Army directed that a single parachute battalion would be dropped the next day near Souk el-Arba and Béja; the battalion was to contact French forces at Beja to ascertain whether they would remain neutral, or support the Allies; secure and guard the cross roads and airfield at Soul el Arba; and patrol eastwards to harass German forces.

Hill argued that as a result his men were exhausted, and he did not believe all of the battalion's equipment could be sorted out within twenty four hours; as such he asked for the operation to be postponed for a short period, but this was denied.

[33][34] To ensure that the aircraft found the drop zone and delivered the battalion accurately, Hill decided that he would sit in the cockpit of the leading Dakota and assist the pilot.

[34] The battalion's second in command, Major Pearson, remained at the airfield with a small detachment which collected airborne equipment and supervised the burial of the casualty.

The battalion arrived around 18:00 and was welcomed by the local French garrison, 3,000 strong, which Hill managed to persuade to cooperate with the paratroopers; in order to give the garrison and any German observers the impression that he possessed a larger force than he actually did, Hill arranged for the battalion to march through the town several times, wearing different headgear and holding different equipment each time.

[37] A short time after the battalion entered Béja, several German aircraft arrived and bombed the town, although they caused little damage and no casualties.

Hill drew his revolver, and with his adjutant and a small group of paratroopers advanced on the tanks, firing shots through their observation ports in an attempt to persuade the crews to surrender.

[50] Hill survived because of prompt medical treatment, and was replaced as commander of the battalion by Major Pearson, who supervised the routing of the rest of the German and Italian soldiers.

The Germans were repelled, but at dusk Frost pulled the battalion back westwards to a more defensible position, hoping to await the arrival of advance units from British First Army.

[61] The German commander sent one of the captured paratroopers with a message demanding Frost surrender, but he refused to comply; instead he ordered that the radios and mortars were to be destroyed and the battalion would evacuate westwards towards Allied lines, approximately fifty miles away.

[63] Now positioned on the high ground, which consisted of a ridge crowned by two small hills, the paratroopers were attacked by tanks and infantry supported by heavy mortar fire.

[68] Stragglers continued to reach Allied lines over the next few days, aided by units from the 56th Reconnaissance Regiment,[69] but the battalion ultimately suffered sixteen officers and 250 other ranks killed, captured or wounded during the mission.

As Frost and his men retreated from Oudna, the Brigade had been informed it would be used in an infantry role, and on 11 December it came under the operational control of British V Corps and moved to positions near Beda; when it arrived No.

[73] The brigade took up defensive positions around Beda and deployed patrols around the immediate vicinity, but remained in a static role; on 21 December it was placed under the command of 78th Infantry Division to participate in an attack towards Tunis, but heavy rain caused this operation to be cancelled.

[74] When it was decided that continuing poor weather made any further assault towards Tunis impractical, Brigadier Flavell asked that the brigade be transferred to the rear so that it could be used in an airborne role.

His request was denied, however, as V Corps stated that there were insufficient troops to replace the brigade; as such it remained in its positions, defending the entire Beda area.

[76] On the night of 7 8 January the brigade was relieved from the frontline and transported to Algiers, with the exception of 2nd Parachute Battalion, which remained under the command of 78th Infantry Division because of a lack of troops to replace it.

1st and 2nd Parachute Battalions launched an attack at 23:00 the same day, taking numerous prisoners and securing their objectives and then repulsed a German counterattack, albeit with heavy losses.

[83] On 31 March the brigade then took up positions covering the left flank of 46th Division, and for the next two weeks it remained in the area, conducting numerous patrols but encountering little opposition.

"[1] This title was later officially confirmed by General Sir Harold Alexander, commanding the 18th Army Group, and applied henceforth to all British airborne troops.

[86] Lieutenant Colonel Terence Otway, who compiled the official history of the British Army's airborne forces during the Second World War, analysed the brigades' actions throughout the campaign.

[74] Otway considered the brigade to have performed its ground role of day and night patrols well, but was unaccustomed to cooperating with other arms, particularly artillery and armour, because of a lack of training, and was forced to learn these skills during combat.