Britain's role in the Spanish American wars of independence combines the military, political and diplomatic routes adopted by them, as well as its merchants and private citizens during the conflict.

Following this attempts had been made by the British to establish a foothold in South America; most however failed, notably in 1741 at the Battle of Cartagena de Indias during the War of Jenkins' Ear.

The revolutionary Franciso de Miranda made use of the crisis to present to some British cabinet ministers his ideas about the independence of Spanish territories in America.

Miranda's proposal was therefore cancelled, but the idea bore fruit for a future conflict; the politician Nicholas Vansittart implemented the 'Vansittart Plan in 1795, with the aim of an expedition striking Buenos Aires and from then on to Callao via the Andes.

George Canning during his time as Foreign Office secretary became deeply involved in the affairs of Spain, Portugal and South America.

This was to keep Spain separate from the French post-Napoleonic period, which was feared would break the European balance of power whilst the British wanted to preserve their colonial interests around the world.

Consequently, the United Kingdom rejected the requests of the revolutionary commissioners to recognize their independence but would offer military and financial support allowed under British law.

Before 1817 a few British combatants had participated in early phases of the struggle in different parts of South America, in mostly isolated - but still relevant - actions such as the Battle of Martín García.

The circumstances were very favourable - with the help of Venezuelan agents and adventurers such as Gregor MacGregor, British officers and sergeants were recruited forming their own regiments.

[13] The Foreign Office however denied any illegal act whilst Castlereagh tried to minimize the problem, assuring the Spanish that these were specific cases, without employment.

He refused to consider making any concessions to the Revolutionaries which caused the British government to regard with more friendly eyes the prospect of South American Independence.

[14] During September, the recruitment was already well-known and public, and newspapers gave details of troops and war material in ships destined towards South America.

He claimed that this prohibition was irreconcilable with British public opinion, without introducing, at the same time, mediation and free trade in Britain with the Spanish colonies.

[2] With Britain's complete control of the seas and her colonies in the Caribbean, notably Jamaica and Trinidad, this made arms trafficking far easier to accomplish.

[16] British merchants both in the Caribbean and in Europe gave loans and supplies that enabled the South American revolutionaries to secure the means to carry out further campaigns.

They formed the battalions of infantry Albion, Carabobo and Rifles, regiments of cavalry like the Hussars, although their members also fought in other South American units.

Bolivar credited them with the victory at the subsequent Battle of Boyacá on August 7, 1819, saying "those soldier-liberators are the men who deserve these laurels" and awarded with the 'Order of the Liberator' one of the rare occasions during the war when this decoration was bestowed onto an entire unit.

[20] They also took part of the last major campaign of the Independence wars in 1824, culminating in the battles of Junín and Ayacucho in Peru, which marked the end of the Spanish rule in South America.

Two most notable officers were William Miller, whose cavalry led the decisive charge at the Battle of Junin in 1824 and Francis Burdett O'Connor, who later became chief of staff to Antonio José de Sucre.

One of those ships and captains was John Illingworth, commanding the Rosa de los Andes, classified as a sixth rate warship by the Royal Navy.

[24]Working in coordination with Chilean leader Bernardo O'Higgins, Cochrane and his fleet which contained many Britons, blockaded and raided the coasts of Chile, as he had done so successfully with those of France and Spain.

[25] Under the orders of General José de San Martín, Cochrane blockaded the coast of Peru in support of the campaign for independence.

[27] Guisse and other British officers including John Illingworth nevertheless carried on the fight and took part in the final campaign in the Peruvian war of Independence which saw the conquest of Callao from the Spanish by 23 January 1826.

This affirmed that he could only open proceedings against convicts in British courts, which prohibited service abroad, in favor of a prince, state or potentate.

For Castlereagh, this placed his government in a dilemma against public opinion, since it made Britain's neutrality impossible, either by recognizing an independence prematurely, or accusing the British of helping the insurgents.

Therefore, he concluded that a new law was required, but deferred, since it was not convenient to discuss it publicly in the parliament of the United Kingdom in 1818, while the war had not been yet been decided in favour with the potential possibility of mediation.

[30] In addition to the enlistment ban other clauses were made; provisions for the trial, detention of ships carrying recruits and armament of warships for foreign service.

[29] With the Royal Navy in command of the oceans this set the precedence - they were a decisive factor in the struggle for independence of certain Latin American countries.