Despite an impressive German defense, the Red Army was able to stage several breakthroughs, liberating several major cities, including Smolensk and Roslavl.

In the course of the operation, the Red Army also definitively drove back German forces from the Smolensk land bridge, historically the most important approach for a western attack on Moscow.

Moreover, like many south-flowing rivers in Europe, the Dnieper's western bank, which was held by German troops, was higher and steeper than the eastern.

After rainfall, which was quite common during the Russian summer, most of them were turned into mud (a phenomenon known as rasputitsa), greatly slowing down any advance of mechanized troops, and raising logistical issues as well.

For instance, at the end of July 1943, a German staff briefing stated: On the front... held by the Army Group Center many signs show a continuous preparation to a yet limited offensive (Roslavl, Smolensk, Vitebsk) and of a maneuver of immobilization of the Army Group Center...[10] The front had been more or less stable for four to five months (and up to 18 months in several places) before the battle, and possessed geographical features favorable for a strong defensive setup.

The main defense line, 5 km (3.1 mi) deep, possessed three sets of trenches and firing points, linked by an extensive communication network.

In some places, where heavy tank attacks were feared, the third set of trenches was in fact a solid antitank moat with a steep western side integrating artillery and machine guns emplacements.

Additionally, the main urban centers located on the defense line (such as Yelnya, Dukhovshchina and Spas-Demensk) were reinforced and fortified, preparing them for a potentially long fight.

By feeding reserve troops to battle, the Red Army managed to advance to a depth varying from 15–25 km (9.3–15.5 mi) by 11 August.

The Wehrmacht had fewer troops and only limited reserves in this area, enabling the 10th Army to break through German lines and advance 10 km (6.2 mi) in two days.

The 5th Mechanized Corps,[16] relocated from Kirov and committed to battle in order to exploit the breakthrough, failed in its mission, mainly because a poorly organized anti-aircraft defense enabled Luftwaffe dive bombers to attack its Valentine tanks with some impunity.

[17] As ordered by the Stavka (the Soviet Armed Forces Command), the Dukhovshchina-Demidov Offensive Operation near Dukhovshchina started almost a week later, on 13 August.

The resulting stalemate, while not a defeat per se, was stinging for Soviet commanders, who provided several explanations for their failure to press forward.

Deputy Chief of General Staff General A. I. Antonov reported "We have to deal both with forests and swamps and with increasing resistance of enemy troops reinforced by divisions arriving from Bryansk region"[20] while Marshal Nikolai Voronov, formerly a Stavka member, analysed the stalemate in his memoirs, publishing what he saw as the eight primary causes:[21] With all these factors considered, Voronov demanded that the 4th Tank Army and the 8th Artillery Corps be transferred from the Bryansk Front and committed to support the attack near Smolensk.

[22] The stalemate was far from what had been desired by the Stavka, but it had at least one merit: it tied down as much as 40% of all Wehrmacht divisions on the Eastern Front near Smolensk, making the task for troops fighting in the south and near Kursk much easier.

[23] The Stavka planned to resume the offensive on 21 August, but decided to postpone it slightly to give Soviet units time to resupply and reinforce.

As a result, the two Soviet counteroffensives that followed the Kursk Defensive Operation (5–23 July) proceeded relatively easily for the Red Army around Oryol, creating a large salient south of Smolensk and Bryansk.

[25] The Yelnya-Dorogobuzh Offensive Operation was considered the "key" to Smolensk and Wehrmacht troops created a massive fortified defensive position around the city.

Swampy areas on the Desna and Ugra rivers were mined and heavy guns set up on hills overlooking the city.

Leaving the Germans no time to regroup, Red Army troops attacked the city and started to form an encirclement.

This commenced a full-scale retreat by Wehrmacht troops from the area and by 3 September, Soviet forces had reached the eastern shore of the Dniepr.

As the result, the Wehrmacht defense line protecting Smolensk was overrun, exposing the troops defending the city to envelopment.

The following day, Stavka ordered the Western Front troops to reach Smolensk before 27 September, then to proceed towards Orsha and Mogilev.

On 25 September, after an assault crossing of the northern Dnieper and street fighting that lasted all night, Soviet troops completed the liberation of Smolensk.

By 30 September, the Soviet offensive force were tired and depleted, and became bogged down outside Vitebsk, Orsha, and Mogilev, which were still held by Wehrmacht troops, and on 2 October the Smolensk operation was concluded.

An essay written after the war by several Wehrmacht officers stated that: Although the vigorous actions of their command and troops allowed the Germans to create a continuous front, there was no doubt that the poor condition of the troops, the complete lack of reserves, and the unavoidable lengthening of individual units' lines concealed the danger that the next major Soviet attack would cause this patchwork front—constructed with such difficulty—to collapse.

[8] After the Smolensk offensive, the central part of the Soviet-German front stabilized again for many months until late June 1944, while the major fighting shifted to the south for the Dnieper line and the territory of Ukraine.

Only during January 1944 would the front move again in the north, when German forces were driven back from Leningrad, completely lifting the siege which had lasted for 900 days.

Finally, Operation Bagration in summer 1944 allowed the Red Army to clear almost all the remaining territory of the USSR of Wehrmacht troops, ending German occupation and shifting the war into Poland and Germany.