Buddhist logico-epistemology
[3][4] The early Buddhist texts show that the historical Buddha was familiar with certain rules of reasoning used for debating purposes and made use of these against his opponents.
Logic in classical India, writes Bimal Krishna Matilal, is "the systematic study of informal inference-patterns, the rules of debate, the identification of sound inference vis-à-vis sophistical argument, and similar topics.
The art of conducting a philosophical debate was prevalent probably as early as the time of the Buddha and the Mahavira (Jina), but it became more systematic and methodical a few hundred years later.
[1][2]: 12 According to Georges Dreyfus, while Western logic tends to be focused on formal validity and deduction: The concern of Indian "logicians" is quite different.
They intend to provide a critical and systematic analysis of the diverse means of correct cognition that we use practically in our quest for knowledge.
Within this context, which is mostly epistemological and practically oriented, topics such as the nature and types of correct reasoning that pertain to logic in the large sense of the word are discussed.
KN Jayatilleke, in his "Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge", uses the Pali Nikayas to glean the possible epistemological views of the historical Buddha and those of his contemporaries.
According to his analysis of the Saṅgārava-sutta (AN 3.60), during the Buddha's time, Indian views were divided into three major camps with regards to knowledge:[14]: 170 The Buddha rejected the first view in several texts such as the Kalama sutta, arguing that a claim to scriptural authority (sadda) was not a source of knowledge, as was claimed by the later Hindu Mimamsa school.
"[14]: 457 Jayatilleke argues the Buddhas statements in the Nikayas tacitly imply an adherence to some form of correspondence theory, this is most explicit in the Apannaka Sutta (MN 60).
[14]: 359 Echoing this view, Christian Coseru writes: canonical sources make quite clear that several distinct factors play a crucial role in the acquisition of knowledge.
[18]The Early Buddhist Texts show that during this period many different kinds of philosophers often engaged in public debates (vivada).
For example, he held that many concepts or designations (paññatti) could be used in conventional everyday speech while at the same time not referring to anything that exists ultimately (such as the pronouns like "I" and "Me").
[19]: 85–86 The Buddha also divided statements (bhasitam) into two types with regards to their meaning: those which were intelligible, meaningful (sappatihirakatam) and those meaningless or incomprehensible (appatihirakatam).
According to Jayatilleke, these "four forms of predication" can be rendered thus:[14]: 335 The Buddha in the Nikayas seems to regard these as "'the four possible positions or logical alternatives that a proposition can take".
"[21] In the Kathāvatthu, a proper reasoned dialogue (vadayutti) is structured as follows: there is a point of contention – whether A is B; this is divided into several 'openings' (atthamukha):[21] These help clarify the attitude of someone towards their thesis in the proceeding argumentative process.
In describing the art of debate and dialogue, Nagasena states: When scholars talk a matter over one with another, then is there a winding up, an unravelling, one or other is convicted of error, and he then acknowledges his mistake; distinctions are drawn, and contra-distinctions; and yet thereby they are not angered.
There is an 'unravelling' or explication (nibbethanam) of one's thesis and stances and then there is also a 'winding up' ending in the censure (niggaho) of one side based on premises he has accepted and the rejoinders of his opponent.
The text systematically lays out logical rules for argumentation in the form of a five-step schema and also sets forth a theory of epistemology.
The systematic discussions of the Nyaya school influenced the Medieval Buddhist philosophers who developed their own theories of inferential reasoning and epistemic warrant (pramana).
In Nagarjuna's works and those of his followers, the four positions on a particular thesis are negated or ruled out (pratiṣedha) as exemplified by the first verse of Nagarjuna's Middle way verses which focuses on a critique of causation:[25] Entities of any kind are not ever found anywhere produced from themselves, from another, from both [themselves and another], and also from no cause.Nagarjuna also famously relied upon refutation based argumentation (vitanda) drawing out the consequences (prasaṅga) and presuppositions of his opponents' own theories and showing them to be self refuting.
[9]: 52 According to Matilal, Nagarjuna's position of not putting forth any implied thesis through his refutations would be rational if seen as a form of illocutionary act.
Nagarjuna also discusses the four modes of knowing of the Nyaya school, but he is unwilling to accept that such epistemic means bring us ultimate knowledge.
[18] Nagarjuna's epistemic stance continues to be debated among modern scholars, his skepticism of the ability of reason and language to capture the nature of reality and his view of reality as being empty of true existence have led some to see him as a skeptic, mystic, nihilist or agnostic, while others interpret him as a Wittgensteinian analyst, an anti-realist, or deconstructionist.
Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇavārttika, remains in Tibet as a central text on pramana and was widely commented on by various Indian and Tibetan scholars.
Thus, far from seeing a tension between empirical scrutiny and the exercise of reason, the Buddhist epistemological enterprise positions itself not merely as a dialogical disputational method for avoiding unwarranted beliefs, but as a practice aimed at achieving concrete, pragmatic ends.
As Dharmakīrti reminds his fellow Buddhists, the successful accomplishment of any human goal is wholly dependent on having correct knowledge.
Fyodor Stcherbatsky divided the followers and commentators on Dharmakirti into three main groups:[34]: 39–43 Some of the other figures of the epistemological school include:[35][28][26][36][37] Dignāga also influenced non-Buddhist Sanskrit thinkers.
Prabhākara (active c. 6th century) meanwhile, may have been influenced by Buddhist reasoning to move away from some of the realistic views of older Mīmāṃsā thought.
[34]: 52 Even the "New Reason" (Navya Nyāya) scholar Gaṅgeśa Upādhyāya shows an influence from the Buddhist epistemological school, in his arrangement of his Tattvacintāmaṇi.
[2]: 22 There is also another tradition of interpretation founded by Sakya Pandita (1182–1251), who wrote the Tshad-ma rigs-gter (English: "Treasury of Logic on Valid Cognition").
