Bush–Aznar memo

The Bush–Aznar memo is reportedly a documentation of a February 22, 2003 conversation in Crawford, Texas between US president George W. Bush, Prime Minister of Spain José María Aznar, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, Daniel Fried, Alberto Carnero, and Javier Rupérez, the Spanish ambassador to the U.S. British Prime Minister Tony Blair and Italian Prime Minister Berlusconi participated by telephone.

Rupérez transcribed the meeting's details which El País, a Madrid daily newspaper, published on September 26, 2007.

[1] The conversation focuses on the efforts of the US, UK, and Spain to get a second resolution passed by the United Nations Security Council.

The memo also possible motivations for members of the United Nations Security Council to support US policy: he tells Aznar that failures to support the resolution could endanger Angola's foreign aid from the Millennium Challenge Account and the pending free trade agreement with Chile (awaiting ratification in the United States Senate at the time).

Aznar prefers three days later so the General Affairs and External Relations Council can meet beforehand.

Bush envisions a resolution similar to one passed during the Kosovo conflict, and "he wants it written so that it does not contain obligatory elements, that does not mention the use of force, and that states that Saddam Hussein has been unable to fulfill his obligations."

Bush thinks they can "win without destruction," and that Iraq has good foundations including a strong bureaucracy and civil society.

Bush replies that he cares little about the content of the message, and Aznar responds that the Spanish will send the Americans some text for the resolution.

Aznar then discusses his upcoming meeting with President of France Jacques Chirac on February 26, shortly after the resolution is announced.

He says that failure to support the resolution could endanger foreign aid to Angola the ratification of a free trade agreement with Chile in the senate.

Bush responds that he will help by making a speech outlining his goals and putting the issue in a "higher context."

Prime minister Aznar: Better Tuesday, after the meeting of the Council of General Affairs of the European Union.

It is important to maintain the momentum gained by the resolution at the summit of the European Union [in Brussels, Monday 17 of February].

We will see that the resolution is written so that it does not contain obligatory steps [for Iraq], that it does not mention the use of force, and that it states that Saddam Hussein has been unable to fulfill his obligations.

We are thinking about as simple a resolution as possible, without many details regarding [Iraq's] obligations–such that Saddam Hussein could use them as stages and consequently could neglect to fulfill them.

We are speaking with Blix [head of the inspectors of the UN] and others of his team to get ideas that can serve to introduce the resolution.

[Russia, China and France have, along with the U.S.A. and the United Kingdom the right to a veto in the Security Council by virtue of being permanent members] Saddam Hussein is not disarming.

In the Security Council we have the three African members [Cameroun, Angola and Guinea], the Chileans, and the Mexicans.

We know that they have accumulated an enormous amount of dynamite to demolish bridges and other infrastructure and to blow up the oil wells.

Aznar: Saddam Hussein has not cooperated, has not been disarmed; we would have to summarize his breaches and to send a more detailed message.

The problem is that Chirac thinks he is Mister Arab, but in fact he is making their lives impossible.

Bush: Countries like Mexico, Chile, Angola, and Cameroon must realize that what's at stake is the security of the United States, and they should act with a sense of friendship toward us.

[Chilean President Ricardo] Lagos should know that the Free Trade Accord with Chile is awaiting Senate confirmation and a negative attitude about this could put ratification in danger.

Angola is receiving Millennium Account funds [to help alleviate poverty] and that could be jeopardized also if he's not supportive.

Aznar: In fact the biggest success would be to win the game without firing a single shot and entering Baghdad.

Wednesday I am going to speak on the situation in the Middle East, proposing the new peace plan with which you are familiar, and on weapons of mass destruction, on the benefits of a free society, and I will locate the history of Iraq in a wider context.

When within a few years History judges us, I do not want people to ask themselves why Bush, or Aznar, or Blair did not face their responsibilities.

Recently, in Romania they reminded me of the example of Ceausescu: it was enough for a woman to call him a liar, for the entire repressive edifice to come down.

It irritates me a great deal to consider the indifference of the Europeans to the sufferings that Saddam Hussein inflicts on Iraqis.

I will not forget what Solana once said to me: why do we Americans think that the Europeans are anti-Semitic and unable to confront their responsibilities?

Bush and Aznar at a public press conference in Crawford on February 22, 2003, the same day as the conversation documented in the memo