500, is a decision by the Supreme Court of Canada on the applicability of fundamental justice under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms on extradition.

The defendant was a Canadian citizen, Helen Susan Schmidt, who, along with her son Charles Gress and his friend Paul Hildebrand, had kidnapped a young girl in Cleveland, Ohio.

Being charged for child-stealing after having been acquitted of kidnapping would not violate the double jeopardy clause in the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, as the states offences are considered separately from federal offences by the US Supreme Court, Schmidt fought the extradition as a violation of double jeopardy rights under section 11(h) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

For example, torture would be unacceptable, and to make that point the Court cited Altun v. Germany (1983), a case that was considered by the European Commission on Human Rights.

Compared to regular operations in another country, the variety of guarantees under fundamental justice in Canada could be seen as "finicky" and thus need not be considered in extradition cases.

The presumption of innocence was one right the Court identified that if breached would not shock the conscience even though it is part of fundamental justice in Canada.

While double jeopardy is a part of fundamental justice in Canada, La Forest wrote, "I do not think our constitutional standards can be imposed on other countries."

Finally, it noted, "It is interesting that, as we saw, the United States Supreme Court has repeatedly held that successive prosecutions at the federal and state level do not automatically offend against the due process clause, the spirit and content of which bears some resemblance to s. 7 of the Charter, although the courts would act to prevent oppressive behaviour."

In Suresh v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (2002), the Court ruled that a possibility of torture would shock the conscience.

Professor Peter Hogg, in noting how the definition of fundamental justice has been ambiguous and that the courts have taken on "enormous discretion," argues that a shocked conscience is particularly difficult to measure.