Carlo-francoism
Though mainstream Carlism retained an independent stand, many Carlist militants on their own assumed various roles in the Francoist system, e.g. as members of the FET y de las JONS executive, Cortes procuradores, or civil governors.
Carlism, the movement born in the 1830s, during the following 100 years became known for rigid, die-hard, adamant stand – by supporters hailed as virtuous principled consistency and by opponents ridiculed as backwater fanaticism – rather than for political compromise and give-and-take alliances.
[18] Even mild and provisional attempts to co-ordinate political strategy within the monarchist camp generated enormous internal resistance and were eventually abandoned, like in case of the so-called TYRE in the mid-1930s.
[19] Until the late 19th century the Traditionalists viewed the army as a backbone of godless state, ravaged by liberalism, masonry and secularism[citation needed];[20] this approach started to change in the 1880s.
While highly suspicious of other parties and unwilling to engage in political trade-offs, since the late 19th century Carlism was increasingly looking towards the military as to a potential partner on the path towards seizing power.
Encouraged by the rise of Boulangism in France, they started to hope for a general who would be prepared to carry out a conservative coup d’état; in such case, they were ready to lend him their support.
[23] During first months of the Civil War the Traditionalists viewed the anti-Republican coalition as sort of a Carlist-military alliance; they were increasingly baffled by the rise of general Franco, who in apparent disregard of earlier agreements started to consolidate power and to marginalize all independent political groupings.
On the one hand, they appreciated the need for political unity as means of winning the war; some of their earlier documents have actually advocated that all parties get dissolved and a common patriotic front be created, most likely themselves assuming the leading role.
Though executive bodies like Junta Nacional Carlista de Guerra ceased to meet, by means of semi-clandestine pre-war territorial structures or informal communication networks the Traditionalists tried to save their property from takeover by FET and to retain own political identity of the movement.
[35] Their attitude towards the unificated state party and the emerging Francoist regime was highly ambiguous; falling short of explicit opposition, it amounted to marginal controlled participation.
[37] In case of major administrative jobs like civil governors or mayors of large cities the Comunión leaders welcomed appointments of their men given the individuals in question kept working for the cause and do not abandon the Traditionalist outlook.
In their new party and state roles some actively promoted Traditionalism e.g. by means of propaganda or personal appointments, some strictly stuck to the official "unificated" line, and some turned into zealous new Falangists, advancing national-syndicalism and at times engineering anti-Traditionalist measures.
It was also distinct from independent Carlism, which continued to operate on the verge of legality, beyond the official political framework and at times assuming recalcitrant, if not openly opposing stance versus the regime.
[44] Other scholars agree that numerous individuals have probably joined due to opportunism and careerism; they concluded that active engagement in Francoist structures would improve their personal lot, and that non-participation would harm their position.
[46] Some concluded that with death of Alfonso Carlos and new polarization caused by the Civil War, Carlism was to melt down in a new political amalgam, possibly embodied in the emerging Francoist state.
[51] Carloctavistas placed all their bets on the regime, either with the intention to outsmart the dictator or in genuine hope of a monarchist-Francoist merger; in some regions of Spain they formed a large fraction of Traditionalists and might have even outnumbered the mainstream Javieristas.
[54] The movement returned to the earlier controlled access strategy and its members,[55] including top leaders, started to aspire to official posts;[56] the process produced another wave of Carlists landing jobs within state, party and media structures.
[76] They clung to their Carlism not as to an independent political standing, but approached it as a valid component of the fused ideology, especially after the system shook off major vestiges of Fascism and started to pose as “monarquía tradicional católica, social y representativa”.
One section worked for the cause of the Alfonsist claimant Don Juan, considered ready to adopt Traditionalist principles; this bid was associated with the concept of a somewhat liberalized regime.
A wave of militants from the independent Carlist Javierista branch landed posts in FET Consejo Nacional and in the Cortes; their objective was to promote Don Carlos Hugo as a prospective Franco-appointed king.
At the time a group of influential carlo-franquistas were already engaged in so-called “operación salmón”, a long campaign in support of Don Juan Carlos as the future king of Spain.
The only person who built his own clientage was conde Rodezno[citation needed], minister of justice in 1938-1939 and member of the Cortes later; since the late 1930s until the early 1950s he was leading a group named Rodeznistas.
On one hand, numerous high-level overviews of history of Spain or the Spanish Civil War tend to blanket statements which suggest that Carlism was absorbed in FET and ceased to exist as autonomous political current.
Moreover, numerous carlo-francoists did not maintain a consistent stand during almost 40 years of the Franco regime; many demonstrated a vacillating approach, marked by varying modes of engagement or even by erratic twists and turns of their careers.
Some individuals outwardly rejected high ministerial jobs in the 1940s but were aspiring to them in the 1960s; when eventually assuming prestigious posts they could have adhered to Francoist orthodoxy or they could have advanced own political schemes.
[143] Finally, some having entered the regime identified with it totally and throughout the rest of their career remained militant Francoists, engaged in eradicating perceived opposition or groupings deemed not sufficiently loyal to caudillo.
Though as part of the official amalgam the Traditionalists are deemed co-responsible for final Nationalist triumph in the Civil War, repressive policy of early Francoism or some liberalization of the regime later on, no scholar claims they can be credited for shaping the system.
[150] Ley de Sucesión en la Jefatura del Estado of 1947, co-drafted by Carlists in the ministry of justice, was by many viewed as designed with the Carloctavista claimant in mind.
[152] The 1958-adopted Ley de Principios del Movimiento Nacional defined the state party using a Carlist notion of a “comunión” and declared Spain “monarquía tradicional, católica, social y representativa”, which vaguely resembled Traditionalist outline; however, practical effects were none.
Their defeat was marked by adoption of Ley de Libertad Religiosa in 1967;[158] it contravened most fundamental Carlist principles and was followed by further transformation, leading towards buildup of consumer, democratic, secular society.
