Throughout 1938, many key Republicans developed doubts about Prime Minister Juan Negrín's strategy to keep on fighting; the Communist Party, acting in the interest of the Soviet Union, was identified as its chief proponent.

[1] In early February, top military commanders tentatively agreed that in case Negrín – at the time trapped in isolated Catalonia – returns to the central zone, he should be removed from power.

[2] Around the same time 3 major Anarchist organisations, CNT, FAI and FJL, tried to sound Miaja on creating a “united anti-fascist organization” which would assume power in the central zone; its purpose was not that much commencing peace talks, but rather sidetracking the Communists.

Since January, Casado maintained contacts with Nationalist agents active in Madrid; on February 15 he received confirmation that Francisco Franco was ready to enter talks on Republican surrender.

[7] They had overwhelming support of the wide array of Anarchist organisations; a stormy plenary meeting of February 24 confirmed vehement hostility to the Communists and endorsed labors against “any sort of dictatorship”, though it remained inconclusive as to seeking peace with the Nationalists.

The PSOE politician of most prestigious standing who resided in the Republican zone was Juan Besteiro, since January 1939 engaged in cautious talks with military commanders on forming a local peace-seeking power structure.

As a few were considered ready to capitulate, some Communist leaders suggested either appointing political commissars to top army structures, which would require their co-signature under any order, or deposing them; the list of those suspected included Miaja and Casado.

Since mid-February, Negrín was being informed by the army intelligence SIM about highly suspicious meetings taking place in Madrid between some key military on the one hand, and shady figures possibly related to Nationalist espionage network, politicians and foreign diplomats on the other.

[14] On March 3 the government made public a number of military nominations; trusted high Communist officers were posted to key positions at the Levantine coast, especially in the provinces of Murcia and Alicante.

Some sources claim that either Negrín or Antonio Cordón García tried to arrange with Casado formal handover of powers, principally to ensure that the Republican government is not entirely compromised internationally.

[22] In the early hours of March 6 Negrín received information that the fleet would not return to Cartagena and was heading to Algeria; this effectively quashed any hope of massive, controlled evacuation from Levantine ports.

Togliatti suggested that last effort to secure some sort of ceasefire agreement should be made with CND; it was a device to gain time in order to ascertain the scale of support for the rebels.

Some in PCE planned last-ditch bulwark of resistance between Albacete, Valencia and Cartagena,[25] but eventually the executive made a last-minute decision to avoid further bloodshed, which effectively forbade fighting CND, and to go underground; most of its members flew out on March 6, too.

[30] Having heard the radio broadcast of Consejo Nacional de Defensa in the evening hours of March 5, the Communist leaders present in Madrid gathered in the PCE operational headquarters.

[32] Two senior local party men Arturo Jiménez and head of the military section Domingo Girón departed to El Pardo at north-western outskirts of Madrid, home to general staff of the II.

PCE envoys from Villa Eloisa had some trouble reaching El Pardo, HQ of Ascanio and distant by some 12 km; northern suburbs of Madrid like Fuencarral were also patrolled by CND units.

The unit changed direction of its assault and instead of pushing south, it started to advance east, towards so-called Posición Jaca, HQ of the Army of the Centre where Ascanio expected to besiege Casado.

Corps) under command of a Communist Manuel Fernández Cortinas [es] manned the frontline at Casa de Campo; on orders from Bueno the unit left its positions and also headed towards the city centre from the west.

In the afternoon both units were approaching Palacio Real and Teatro de la Opera,[38] key objects for the rebels; the former hosted a telephone exchange, and the latter served as giant storage place for arms and munitions.

Their headquarters at Ministerio de Hacienda was some 1.5 km from nearest loyalist units; though at the time the way south was controlled by the Casadistas, there was real threat that their command centre might be cut off any minute.

[45] They carried the orders to stop fighting and to prepare for either evacuation or going to clandestine activities; the news broke out also that the PCE executive had left Spain on March 6–7, and that except Madrid, the Casadistas triumphed in all the Republican zone.

[47] Another version claims that the offer of ceasefire was produced by head of the III Corps Ortega, who despite his Communist affiliations remained neutral and mediated between CND and PCE; according to this perspective, Casado intended to gain time before the reinforcements arrive.

By the evening there were only isolated pockets of Communist resistance in the governmental quarter, as sub-units which previously had tried to penetrate into the Casadista centre failed to withdraw and found themselves encircled by the advancing divisions of Mera.

Servicio de Inteligencia Militar (SIM), the military counter-intelligence service with its Madrid branch controlled by PSOE and headed by the Socialist zealot Ángel Pedrero García [es], carried out the hunt for Communist militants across the city.

He made a series of phone calls to local civil governors which convinced almost all of them (except Alicante) to declare loyalty to the rebels; along the military lines similar action was taken by the freshly Negrín-nominated chief of General Staff, Leopoldo Menéndez, who was part of the plot.

In result, apart from minor counter-action on part of Army of Extremadura in Ciudad Real, ephemeral attempts by some units near Valencia and chaotic melee in the Murcian Cartagena, all provinces fell to CND relatively easily.

[71] Registro Civil de Madrid suggests a similar figure of 243 dead; it is provided as a concluding statement in a recent article, which claims to deal with "myths" related to the 1939 coup.

On March 23 Carillo ordered civil governors to prepare evacuation, but no details were provided; in public statements CND officials declared shipping was being readied for everyone willing to leave Spain.

[93] Somewhat different take is that the hybrid regime of the Republican zone, in which 3 major political groupings tried to impose their own dictatorship and kept each other in check, was doomed from the onset; when degenerated into domination of one party, it produced counter-action.

Most scholars agree that CND failed to achieve 1 of its 3 key objectives, i.e. a “peace without bloodshed”;[99] on the other hand, it secured the other 2: ended Communist domination (yet replaced it not with democracy but own dictatorship), and prevented further deaths resulting from Nationalist-Republican war.