Charles McMoran Wilson, 1st Baron Moran, MC, PRCP (10 November 1882 – 12 April 1977) was personal doctor to Winston Churchill from 1940 until the latter's death in 1965.

His book The Struggle for Survival revealed much about Churchill's physical and psychological state, possibly including clinical depression, while coping with the strain of high office.

[5] He was the dean of St Mary's Hospital Medical School between 1920 and 1945, where he oversaw the rebuilding of the premises, while also maintaining a private practice in London at Number 129, Harley Street.

[2] He was a prominent scientist in his day, and was elected president of the Royal College of Physicians in April 1941 and was re-elected each year until 1950, when he resigned in favour of Russell Brain.

[6] He was knighted in 1938[7] and was created Baron Moran, of Manton in the County of Wilts on 8 March 1943[8] and made his maiden speech in the House of Lords the same year, on the Beveridge Report.

[6] Moran claimed that he had compiled the book with Churchill's knowledge, although he had sought no permission to include conversations made in his professional capacity with the Cabinet Secretary, other officials and medical colleagues.

Formulated in this way, Churchill's mental health history contains unmistakable echoes of the seminal interpretation of Moran's Black Dog revelations made in an essay by Joseph Storr.

[12] In drawing so heavily on Moran for what he took to be the latter's totally reliable, first-hand clinical evidence of Churchill's lifelong struggle with "prolonged and recurrent depression" and its associated "despair", Storr produced a seemingly authoritative and persuasive diagnostic essay that, in the words of John Ramsden, "strongly influenced all later accounts".

Also unnoticed by Storr and others is Moran's statement in his final chapter that Churchill had managed before the start of the First World War "to extirpate bouts of depression from his system".

[19] He also recalled Churchill suggesting in 1946—the year before he put the idea (unsuccessfully) in a memo to President Truman—that the United States make a pre-emptive atomic bomb attack on Moscow while the Soviet Union did not yet possess nuclear weapons.