Days after the beginning of the 2021 Kalay clashes on 28 March 2021, resistance groups in Chin State formed the Chinland Defense Forces on 4 April 2021 to defend civilians from the Tatmadaw's violent crackdowns against protestors.

[10] More than 10,000 people have left Mindat in southern Chin State as the Myanmar military started an all-out operation to quell an armed revolt headed by local citizens.

[3] On 19 September 2021, clashes broke out in Thantlang when Chin National Army (CNA) and CDF-Thantlang launched an attack on a junta base reportedly killing around 30 soldiers.

The regime faced severe setbacks and fired heavy weapons from Kalay University while deploying air support.

[citation needed] On 10 and 12 January 2023, Myanmar Air Force carried out airstrikes with one Yak-130 and two MiG-29[20] targeting Camp Victoria, CNA's headquarters, near the India-Myanmar border.

[28] The conflict between AA and the Myanmar military ended in Paletwa after both parties agreed to a temporary cease-fire with Yōhei Sasakawa's intermediary.

The fight continued until 2 August and resulted in the death of one CDF soldier and a civilian man, forcing nearby residents to flee.

[36] Two days later, residents who had fled to India returned, marking the town as the first in Chin State under the control of the resistance forces.

[38] On the same day, eleven civilians, including eight children, were killed in a Myanmar Air Force airstrike in Vuilu village of Matupi Township, Southern Chin State.

Fighting lasted for five days until 16 January, and involved junta forces shelling and using airstrikes against the attacking EAOs from their position in Kalay.

[43] On 16 May, several Chin resistance groups, including the CBA member Zoland Defense Force, launched an offensive to capture Tonzang from the junta and its allied Zomi Revolutionary Army.

[61] On 7 July, the CNA detained 2 Yaw Defense Force (YDF) soldiers in Gangaw Township for "temporary questioning", taking the detainees to Camp Victoria (80 miles/129 kilometres away).

[63] On 20 July, as part of "Operation Rung", the CDF-Hakha captured the Hakha Main Police Station, releasing 62 detainees.

The discussions culminated in a preliminary peace agreement, with both parties committing to resolve disputes non-violently and to collaborate more closely in their resistance against the Myanmar junta.

[68][69][70] On 9 November, the CBA relaunched Operation Chin Brotherhood, launching simultaneous offensives on Falam and Mindat, capturing most of the former.

However, resistance forces and civil society organizations in Chin State express skepticism about the legitimacy of these elections, viewing them as a strategy for the military to maintain power.

[72] In early December 2024, insurgent forces, including the Chin National Army (CNA) and the CDF, captured four military camps between Hakha and Thantlang after ten days of combat.

The Chin Brotherhood Alliance (CBA) reports dominance in Mindat, Matup, and Kanpetlet townships, while the Chinland Defense Force (CDF) holds Tonzang.

Among the several issues of contention between the groups is the role of the Arakha Army, which has increased presence in southern Chin State since its capture of Paletwa Township in November 2023.

[75] On 31 January 2024, an alliance of 7 Chinland Defence Forces, alongside the Chin National Army (CNA), launched an offensive on Chin Brotherhood Alliance member the Maraland Defence Force after the MDF reportedly killed a CNA soldier and detained several CDF-Mara soldiers.

The ZRA, an armed Zomi nationalist group formed in 1997, has been involved in several clashes with Chin resistance forces.

[80] In September 2023, the ZRA attacked Chin resistance camps in Tonzang Township, resulting in the deaths of two CDF fighters.

[84] In August, a meeting to resolve the dispute between the Chinland Council and the Chin Brotherhood Alliance was scheduled to take place in Delhi.

ZORO’s initiatives have included organizing peace talks, ceasefires, and reconciliation efforts to reduce divisions within the resistance movements.

[89][90] Additionally, the ex Mizoram Chief Minister Zoramthanga has actively supported peacebuilding efforts among the Zo people, emphasizing their shared cultural and political ties across national borders.

His administration has provided platforms for discussions and facilitated diplomatic engagement between Mizoram-based groups and resistance factions in Myanmar.

For instance, Zoramthanga has expressed his commitment to helping resolve conflicts in Chin State and supporting the broader goal of Zo unification.

In September 2024, Mizoram Chief Minister Lalduhoma appealed for closer ties between the Chin and Arakanese communities, advocating for cooperation with the Arakan Army (AA) in the broader context of the Myanmar conflict.

He argued that building a relationship with the AA was necessary to prevent further instability in the region, suggesting that the Myanmar military junta would benefit from division among the ethnic groups.

Khar emphasized that the Chin people would not work with the AA, as moral and ethical considerations, rather than power dynamics, should guide their actions.