The Chinese Nationalists sought German military and economic support to help them consolidate control over factional warlords and resist Japanese imperialism.

However, Joachim von Ribbentrop strongly favored an alliance with Japan over one with China, and starting with the 1936 Anti-Comintern Pact, Germany began to realign its East Asia policy.

To circumvent the treaty's restrictions, German industrial firms formed partnerships with nations such as the Soviet Union and Argentina to produce weapons and sell them legally.

German arms producers began looking to re-establish commercial links with China to tap into its vast market for weapons and military assistance.

[16] The most important industrial project from the Sino-German cooperation was the 1936 Three-Year Plan, which was administered by the Chinese government's National Resources Commission and the Hapro corporation.

It had several basic components, such as the monopolisation of all operations of tungsten and antimony, the construction of the central steel and machine works in Hubei, Hunan, and Sichuan, and the development of power plants and chemical factories.

[11] Von Seeckt's original plans called for a drastic reduction of the military to 60 elite divisions, which would be modeled on the Wehrmacht, but the factions that would be axed remained an open question.

[21] Von Falkenhausen believed that it was too optimistic to expect the National Revolutionary Army (NRA) to be supported by armor and heavy artillery because the industry lacked the necessary capacity.

Thus, he emphasized the creation of a mobile force that relied on small arms and would be adept with infiltration tactics, like those of the German stormtroopers around the end of World War I.

[24] As the 1930s progressed, "the Nazi government began leaning noticeably closer to Japan" while "the advisors (and many members of the German army) continued to push for a stronger Sino-German relationship".

[26] For their part, the Japanese political and military establishments were, by 1934, less than certain about the usefulness of the new Hitler government in Germany, which Tokyo assumed would attempt to maintain a peaceful relationship with the Soviet Union and avoid any open alignment with Moscow's enemies.

[27] So Japanese Ambassador Kintomo Mushanokōji and military attaché Hiroshi Ōshima often worked closely with Ribbentrop to undermine German-Chinese economic and diplomatic relations.

A recognition of Manchukuo, as suggested by German ambassador in Tokyo Herbert von Dirksen beginning in early 1934, would have clearly signaled support for Japanese expansionism.

[28] In response to his initial request to recognize Manchukuo, Ambassador Dirksen was instructed to avoid "any close relations with Japan which might lay [Germany] open to being suspected of wishing to render assistance against Russia".

They assumed that the Soviet Union would receive the aid of the western democracies if it were to break out, and the German Foreign Office sought, at all costs, to avoid entanglement in such a conflict.

[30] Wang Jingwei was in favor of joining the pact, but Chiang Kai-shek was careful not to offend the Soviet Union, which was China's only potential partner in case of a Japanese attack.

[30] A revival of interest in both Tokyo and Berlin led to the signing of the Anti-Comintern Pact on 25 November 1936, without Chinese participation, although China did receive an invitation to join.

[36][37] During a meeting with Hans Georg von Mackensen, Kung argued that Japan was not a reliable ally for Germany, citing as an example the Japanese invasion of Qingdao and the former German colonies in the Pacific Islands during World War I.

After the KMT lost Nanjing and retreated to Wuhan, Hitler's government decided to withdraw its support of China and turn decisively towards Japan.

[42] Ribbentrop was instrumental, in February 1938, in persuading Hitler to recognize the Japanese puppet state of Manchukuo and to renounce German claims upon its former colonies in the Pacific, which were now held by Japan.

[44] At the same time, the end of the informal Sino-German alliance led Chiang to terminate all concessions and contracts held by German companies in Kuomintang China.