China Western Development

The policy covers six provinces (Gansu, Guizhou, Qinghai, Shaanxi, Sichuan and Yunnan), five autonomous regions (Guangxi, Inner Mongolia, Ningxia, Tibet and Xinjiang), and one municipality (Chongqing).

[6] A Leadership Group for Western China Development (西部地区开发领导小组) was created by the State Council in January 2000, led by Zhu.

The plan for western development was formally put forward during the fifth plenary session of the 15th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.

[3]: 401 For these purposes, the western region is defined as Sichuan, Gansu, Guizhou, Yunnan, Qinghai, Shaanxi, the municipality of Chongqing, Ningxia, Xinjiang, and Tibet.

[7]: 133 The main components of the strategy include the development of infrastructure (transport, hydropower plants, energy, and telecommunications), enticement of foreign investment, increased efforts on ecological protection (such as reforestation), promotion of education, and retention of talent flowing to richer provinces.

[citation needed] These projects included new railway lines connecting Guiyang and Guangzhou, Lanzhou and Chongqing, Kashgar and Hotan in Xinjiang; highways between Wanyuan and Dazhou in Sichuan Province, Shuikou and Duyun in Guizhou Province; airport expansion projects in Chengdu, Chongqing and Xi’an.

[citation needed] They also include the building of hydropower stations, coal mines, gas and oil transmission tube lines as well as public utilities projects in western regions.

[11] As part of the program, China's five large state-owned hydropower companies planned, underwrote, and built the majority of dams on the Lancang River and its tributaries.

While massive investment has been accompanied by a boost in GDP across all western regions, the broader policy has failed to achieve its goal of eliminating the economic gap between China's East and West.

[citation needed] Xi Jinping's Belt and Road Initiative built upon the strategies of Jiang's Western development efforts.

[citation needed] Tim Oakes, associate professor of geography at the University of Colorado at Boulder, argues that the decline of foreign investment in certain western regions is a consequence of Beijing's attempt to recentralize the province's economy through mega-projects such as Guizhou's west–east electricity transfer project.

Farmland conversion to forest and grassland is the dominant strategy for this effort, targeting specifically the regions crucial to the Yangtze's protection.

In addition, to compensate farmers for their loss in agricultural profit, the state has committed to supplying them with grains and funds for planting trees and grass.

[26] If the provincial government decides to honor its commitment for another 5–8 years, it will cost a total of 11.7 billion yuan in grain and cash subsidies.