[4][5] Their operations featured long marches through extremely difficult terrain, undertaken by underfed troops often weakened by diseases such as malaria and dysentery.

Wingate trained this force as long-range penetration units that were to be supplied by stores parachuted or dropped from transport aircraft and were to use close air support as a substitute for heavy artillery.

[8] They would penetrate the jungle on foot, essentially relying on surprise through mobility to target enemy lines of communication (a tactic that the Japanese had previously used in 1942 to great effect against British forces in Malaya and Burma).

[9] The heavy weapons, radios, reserve ammunition, and rations and other stores were carried on mules, which would also provide an emergency source of food once their loads had been depleted.

This included a personal weapon, such as the SMLE rifle or Sten Gun, ammunition, grenades, a machete or Gurkha kukri knife, seven days' rations, groundsheet, change of uniform and other assorted items.

Two columns marched to the south and received their air supply drops in broad daylight to create an impression that they were the main attack.

Water was difficult to obtain and the combination of rivers with a good system of roads in the area allowed the Japanese to force the Chindits into a progressively smaller "box".

[11][6] Of the remaining men, Wingate practically hand picked those few he would retain, while the rest were put back under the normal army command structure as part of their original battalions.

The report had a tendency to excuse any mistakes made by its author (Wingate), while making vicious attacks on other officers, often based on limited information.

His concepts for long-range penetration operations behind Japanese lines received official backing at high level, and he obtained substantial US support for his force.

As the members of the first expedition were making their way back to India, a second long range penetration unit, 111th Indian Infantry Brigade was being formed.

[12] Popularly known as The Leopards,[12] the brigade was raised by General Wavell without the knowledge of Wingate, who was still in Burma and who was known to have a strong dislike for the Indian Army, its diverse troop formations, and its British officers in particular.

However, Wingate returned from Quebec with authority to implement far more ambitious plans for the second expedition, which required that the force be greatly expanded to a strength of six brigades.

Calvert and Fergusson, both newly promoted to Brigadier, took command of two of the brigades, and were responsible for much of the training program and the development of tactical planning.

[citation needed] Wingate himself was absent for much of the training period, first being out of the country to attend the Quebec Conference and then struck ill with typhoid from drinking bad water in North Africa on his return.

In November, the overall plan for the dry season campaign of 1944 determined by South East Asia Command focused on the use of the Chindits in the reconquest of northern Burma.

Cochran and Alison of the 1st Air Commando Group, to march and fly into Indaw and from there under the command of the Fourteenth Army carry out the objectives of: (i) Helping the advance of Stilwell's Ledo force on Myitkyina by cutting the communications of the Japanese 18th Division, harassing its rear, and preventing its reinforcement.

The real problem was the failure to maintain continuous observation of the landing zones (e.g. by high-flying Spitfire photo-reconnaissance aircraft) before the forces were deployed.

Calvert's brigade established yet another, named White City at Mawlu, astride the main railway and road leading to the Japanese northern front.

[30] The force's second-in-command, Major General George William Symes, was bypassed by Slim and formally protested and asked to be relieved.

Nineteen Allied soldiers, who were so badly injured as to be beyond hope of recovery and could not be moved, were shot by the medical orderlies and hidden in heavy stands of bamboo.

Fearing that they would then be ordered to join the siege of Myitkyina, Calvert handed Mogaung over to Force X, shut down his radios and retreated to Kamaing, where Stilwell had his headquarters.

However, when the army command evaluated the men and equipment required to return the Chindits to operational status, it was decided to transform the force into an Airborne Division in India.

[40] The memorial is a 4 metre (13 ft) high Portland stone pillar mounted on three steps, on which is a statue by Frank Forster of the chinthe, after which the Chindits are named.

The debate is part of the ongoing one of whether the deployment of special forces are a net asset to a campaign or whether the investment in time, material and men that such operations demand outweigh the advantages gained.

The views of the majority of the post-war British military establishment were made succinctly by Slim (commander of the Fourteenth Army), when he wrote "... the Chindits, gave a splendid example of courage and hardihood.

[43] Others, like Sir Robert Thompson, an ex-Chindit, have asserted that the idea behind the Chindits was a sound one but that they were just badly handled and used in operations for which they were not properly equipped or trained, for example in static defence.

[44] A third view is that, despite the relatively insignificant losses that the Chindits were able to inflict, their propaganda value in 1943, at a time when the Army was on the defensive, was a morale boost to the people of India and Britain, and helping to dispel the image of Japanese invincibility.

It has also been argued that the Chindits contributed to the overall success of the Allied armies in Burma through the innovations in air supply techniques and organisation that their operations required.

Conversely, it has been argued that the apparent success of the Chindits led some Japanese commanders to believe that they could employ their own incursion tactics on a much larger scale, and that when they came to implement such tactics during the Chindwin offensive of early 1944, lacking the necessary air support that had enabled the Allies to be successful, the result was disastrous and ultimately led to defeat at both Kohima and Imphal, and later on the plains of Burma in 1945.