In the 1880s and early 1890s, the Beiyang Fleet conducted a routine of training exercises and cruises abroad, with emphasis placed on visits to Japan to intimidate the country.

Japanese ground forces seized the city's coastal fortifications on 9 February, allowing their artillery to shell the ships in the harbor, which prompted Ding to surrender.

[3] The ship carried a main battery of four 12 in (305 mm) 20-caliber breech-loading guns in two twin-gun turrets that were placed en echelon forward.

[3][4] Dingyuan was ordered in 1880 and was laid down at the AG Vulcan shipyard in Stettin, Germany in March 1881; her name means "eternal peace" in Chinese.

[7] At the time, China lacked dry docks large enough to handle Zhenyuan and Dingyuan, forcing the navy to rely on shipyards in Japan or in British Hong Kong for periodic maintenance.

[6] The two Dingyuan-class ships began their training routine in April 1886 in joint maneuvers with the units of the Nanyang Fleet, which culminated in a naval review in Port Arthur.

Dingyuan, Zhenyuan, and four cruisers made the first of their overseas cruises in August 1886, which included stops in British Hong Kong, Busan and Wonsan in Korea, Vladivostok, Russia, and Nagasaki, Japan.

The so-called Nagasaki Incident was characterized by the Japanese press as an attempt by China to intimidate Japan, leading to calls for naval expansion to counter the Beiyang Fleet.

The Japanese also refused to allow the Chinese ironclads to return for repairs in their shipyards, hampering the ability of the Beiyang Fleet to keep the vessels operational.

The Beiyang Fleet adopted the same black, white, and buff paint scheme used by the Royal Navy at the time, repainting their vessels at some point in 1888.

Coupled with the Nagasaki Incident, these voyages contributed to the growing tensions between China and Japan, since Hongzhang intended them to make clear Chinese naval strength at a time the Japanese fleet was small and poorly developed.

Japan viewed this as a violation of the Tientsin Convention and deployed 8,000 troops in response, leading to the outbreak of the First Sino-Japanese War on 1 August.

While on the way to the bay, he received faulty reports indicating the presence of Japanese warships off the Shandong Peninsula, prompting him to change course to search for them.

During the unloading process, Dingyuan and the bulk of the fleet remained underway to provide distant support and avoid presenting themselves as stationary targets to Japanese torpedo boats known to be in the area.

While the Chinese were on the way back to Port Arthur, the Combined Fleet under Vice Admiral Itō Sukeyuki intercepted them on 17 September, leading to the Battle of the Yalu River.

Dingyuan opened fire first, at about 12:20, at the extreme range of 5,300 yd (4,800 m), far in excess of what fire-control equipment was capable of accurately directing at the time.

The blast effect from Dingyuan's initial salvo destroyed her own bridge, collapsing it and trapping Ding and his staff for the duration of the action, depriving the Beiyang Fleet of central control.

In return, the Chinese warships inflicted serious damage on the old ironclad Hiei, which had been unable to keep pace with the rest of Itō's fleet, and was eventually forced to disengage and flee.

The battered Beiyang Fleet, by then reduced to the two Dingyuan-class ships and four smaller vessels, limped back to Port Arthur, arriving there the next day.

By October, the Japanese Army had begun to approach Port Arthur, forcing the Chinese to withdraw the Beiyang Fleet to Weihaiwei.

In early November, Ding sortied to cover the transfer of Zhenyuan, which had remained in Port Arthur as long as possible to complete repairs.

The next night, the torpedo boats made another assault on the Chinese fleet, sinking a cruiser, a training ship, and an auxiliary vessel.

The decision provoked many of the senior officers of the Beiyang Fleet to commit suicide, including the ship's commander, Captain Liu Buchan.

Photographic evidence, which shows the vessel aground in shallow water and with a gaping hole amidships, supports these reports, as does the observations of the British Vice Admiral Edmund Fremantle, who inspected the fleet shortly after the battle.