In April 1987, the Church leased a property at 173 W. 5th Street, Hialeah, in Miami-Dade County, Florida and announced its intention to use the site to openly practice the faith.

[7] At the end of the session the city council passed a resolution announcing its commitment to prohibit "all religious groups which are inconsistent with public morals, peace or safety”.

On June 10, 1988, U.S. District Judge Eugene P. Spellman granted absolute immunity to the individual city council members and the mayor.

[15] The Court in Wisconsin v. Yoder (1972) had explicitly provided Amish parents a religious exemption from mandatory school attendance under the Free Exercise Clause.

[18] Kennedy, in a section only joined by Stevens, detailed the ordinances' legislative history, even citing taped excerpts of the Hialeah City Council Meeting.

[7] Next, in a section Souter refused to join, Kennedy noted the numerous exemptions in the Florida statute, concluding the law is not generally applicable because it effectively applies "only against conduct motivated by religious belief.

"[19] Finally, in a section joined by the full seven justice majority, Kennedy applied strict scrutiny, which the city ordinances fail.

To satisfy the commands of the First Amendment, a law restrictive of religious practice must advance" 'interests of the highest order'" and must be narrowly tailored in pursuit of those interests.

The proffered objectives are not pursued with respect to analogous nonreligious conduct, and those interests could be achieved by narrower ordinances that burdened religion to a far lesser degree.

As we show above, see supra, at 543-546, the ordinances are underinclusive to a substantial extent with respect to each of the interests that respondent has asserted, and it is only conduct motivated by religious conviction that bears the weight of the governmental restrictions.

The Free Exercise Clause commits government itself to religious tolerance, and upon even slight suspicion that proposals for state intervention stem from animosity to religion or distrust of its practices, all officials must pause to remember their own high duty to the Constitution and to the rights it secures.

Those in office must be resolute in resisting importunate demands and must ensure that the sole reasons for imposing the burdens of law and regulation are secular.

[23] Justice Souter, writing alone for eighteen pages, noted that "The Smith rule, in my view, may be reexamined consistently with principles of stare decisis.

The court ruled that the ordinances "substantially burden plaintiff's free exercise of religion without advancing a compelling governmental interest using the least restrictive means" and that Merced was entitled under the Texas Religious Freedom Restoration Act (TRFRA) to an injunction preventing the city from enforcing its ordinances that burdened his religious practices relating to the use of animals.