[1] It has since become an object of controversy, cited by some critics as the biggest American mistake made in the immediate aftermath of the fall of Saddam Hussein[2] and as one of the main causes of the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL/ISIS).
[3] Before the United States and coalition partners launched the invasion of Iraq on 20 March 2003, former US Army Lieutenant General Jay Garner and the US military had already laid out several plans for what to do with Iraqi security forces once they were defeated.
Under Secretary of Defense Feith requested some editing of the text on 22 May, and that night Rumsfeld chief of staff Lawrence Di Rita and CPA spokesperson Dan Senor coordinated plans for the actual announcement.
[8] Furthermore, Bremer stated that even before he arrived in Iraq, he sent a draft of the order on 9 May to Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz, Feith, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and then CFLCC Commander, Lieutenant General David McKiernan.
[8] Secretary of State Colin Powell has also said he was never consulted on the matter, which he believed was a major mistake, and then National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice was said to have been surprised by the decision.
[11] The initial draft apparently originated in the Pentagon’s Office of Special Plans led by Abram Shulsky, who recounted that, “There was not a real interagency process….It would have been informal at that point”.
[13] A 2004 report in The Guardian cited senior UK military and intelligence sources saying that British Admiral Michael Boyce told his commanders to negotiate with senior Iraqi Army and Republican Guard officers to switch sides and operate under UK guidance to uphold law and order, but that CPA orders 1 and 2 effectively destroyed any chance to regroup the Iraqi forces for such a plan.