In law, comity is "a principle or practice among political entities such as countries, states, or courts of different jurisdictions, whereby legislative, executive, and judicial acts are mutually recognized.
[9] A group of Dutch jurists created the doctrine of international comity in the late seventeenth century, most prominently Ulrich Huber.
[13] A century after Huber, Lord Mansfield, known for being Chief Justice of the Court of King's Bench in England for three decades, introduced the doctrine of comity to the English law.
[14] Lord Mansfield viewed the application of comity as discretionary, with courts applying foreign law "except to the extent that it conflicted with principles of natural justice or public policy.
"[15] He demonstrated this principle in Somerset v Stewart (King's Bench 1772), which held that slavery was so morally odious that a British court would not recognize the property rights of an American slaveholder in his slave out of comity.
[17] Much like Huber, Story sought to develop a new system of private international law that reflected the new commercial needs of the United States.
[18] Story's view, which ultimately prevailed, was that the consensual or voluntary application of comity doctrine would foster trust among states, "localize the effect of slavery," and reduce the risk of civil war.
[15] In the mid-nineteenth century, John Westlake advanced further the idea that States ought to act with comity for reasons of justice in his Treatise on Private International Law.
[23] At the end of the ninetieth century, the US Supreme Court delivered the classic statement on comity in the decision of Hilton v. Guyot (1895).
[24][25][26] The Court held in that case:[27] "Comity," in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute obligation, on the one hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will, upon the other.
[28] The United States faced significant advancement in its global standing as a military and economic power after the Second World War, and this transformed the principle of comity into something that more closely resembled an obligation to apply foreign law.
[30] In this case, Justice Souter gave the opinion that one only considers comity where there is a "true conflict between domestic and foreign law".
[31] In the United States, certain foreign defamation judgments are not recognized under the SPEECH Act (a federal statute enacted in 2010), which supersedes the comity doctrine.
[39] Justice La Forest acknowledges that the common law approach is not grounded in the realities of modern times as states cannot live in complete isolation due to travel, flow of wealth, skills and people.
[38] The court chose to revise the common law test and enforce a judgment with a "real and substantial connection" between the action or damages suffered and the adjudicating jurisdiction.
[39] This decision had important implications for both interprovincial and international litigations as Canadian courts began to engage with the comity in judgment enforcement.