Unlike pure public goods, common pool resources face problems of congestion or overuse, because they are subtractable.
While the core resource is to be protected or nurtured in order to allow for its continuous exploitation, the fringe units can be harvested or consumed.
[1] Common-pool goods are typically regulated and nurtured in order to prevent demand from overwhelming supply and allow for their continued exploitation.
Examples of common-pool resources include forests, man-made irrigation systems, fishing grounds, and groundwater basins.
[3] In James Bay, Quebec, the beaver was an important species for food and later commerce when the fur trade started in 1670.
Amerindian groups in the area have traditionally used resources communally and have a heritage of customary laws to regulate hunting.
However, in the 1920s the railroads caused a large influx of non-native trappers who took advantage of the high fur prices and the indigenous people losing control of their territories.
Both non-native and native trappers contributed to the decline of the beaver population, prompting conservation laws to be enacted after 1930 and outsiders being banned from trapping in James Bay.
[4] In the New York Bight region, a cooperative of trawl fishermen that specializes in harvesting whiting limits entry into the local fishery and establishes catch quotas among members.
Due to these methods, they have access to the best whiting grounds, dominate the market during winter, and can maintain relatively high prices through supply management.
Examples of common-pool resources include irrigation systems, fishing grounds, pastures, forests, water or the atmosphere.
[6] Under favorable conditions, they can maximize the flow without harming the total storage volume and the entire resource system.
Common property systems of management arise when users acting independently threaten the total net benefit from common-pool resource.
Analysing the design of long-enduring CPR institutions, Elinor Ostrom identified eight design principles which are prerequisites for a stable CPR arrangement:[9] Common property systems typically function at a local level to prevent the overexploitation of a resource system from which fringe units can be extracted.
Adaptive governance is suited to dealing with problems that are complex, uncertain and fragmented,[10] as is the management of common-pool resources.
Changes in market demand for CPR, in particular, technological innovation increases productivity and lowers costs, which undermines the sustainability of the management system.
Such institutional changes prevent the implementation of policies that are beneficial to the majority of the population, while the power of the government and bureaucracy can be abused.
[15] Further, field experiments involving specific ecological features of CPRs, such as water irrigation, forestry, and fisheries, have revealed the impact of various resource-specific dynamics on collective action and resource management.