Conservatism in Greater China
KMT was a Chinese nationalist party that ruled mainland China from 1927 to 1949, and after the anti-communist Shanghai massacre in 1927, Chiang was reinforced in right-wing and conservative elements (such as traditional values).
This movement was related to Chiang Kai-shek's anti-Communist campaign at the time, but today it also inspires conservatives like Xi Jinping of the Chinese Communist Party.
[22][23] Wang Huning, widely regarded as the grey eminence and chief ideologue of the CCP, has criticized aspects of Marxism and recommended that China combine its historical and modern values.
[27] Its origin was based in reworked ideas of Samuel Huntington, who advised the post-Communist East European elite to take a gradualist approach towards market liberalization; hence, "new authoritarianism".
A rejection of the optimistic views on modernization theories,[28] it seeks faster reform of the socialist market economy[29] while the party remain ideologically and organizationally sound.
[28] Following the 1978 Third Plenum, which made Deng Xiaoping Paramount leader, China employed a variety of strategies to develop its economy, beginning the Chinese economic reform.
Though the government took a clear stance against liberalization in December 1986, political discussions centered in Beijing would nonetheless emerge in academic circles in 1988 in the form of democracy and Neoauthoritarianism.
Henry He considers that, while June 4 halted the movement for democracy, because neoauthoritarianism avoids the issue of popular involvement, it would therefore be a downfall for it and General Secretary Zhao Ziyang as well.
[33] New Conservatism or neoconservatism (Chinese: 新保守主义; pinyin: xīn bǎoshǒu zhǔyì) argued for political and economic centralization and the establishment of shared moral values.
In his 1994 article Zheng Yongnian elaborates that, Administrative power should be strengthened in order to provide favorable conditions, especially stable politics, for market development.
Given the dominance of the Chinese state, Zheng believes that, when it is finally implemented, democracy in China is more likely to be a gift from the elite to the society rather than brought about by internal[clarification needed] forces.
[29] Chinese-Canadian sociologist Yuezhi Zhao views the neoauthoritarians as having attempted to avoid an economic crisis through dictatorship,[39] and Barry Sautman characterizes them as reflecting the policy of "pre-revolutionary Chinese leaders" as well as "contemporary Third World strongmen", as part of ideological developments of the decade he considers more recognizable to westerners as conservative and liberal.
"[23] Li Cheng and Lynn T. White nonetheless regard the neoauthoritarians as resonating with technocracy emerging in the 1980s as a result of "dramatic" policy shifts in 1978 that promoted such to top posts.
Since the Sino-British Joint Declaration of 1984, conservatism has been characterised by business elites joining with pro-Communist traditional leftists in a "united front" to resist the rise of the demand for democratisation and liberalisation, in order to secure continued political stability and economic prosperity while maintaining a good relationship with the communist central government in Beijing leading up to and after the 1997 handover.
Historically, conservatism derives from the Chinese tradition of familism and Confucianism and was incorporated into the British colonial government's policies by Governor Cecil Clementi in the 1920s in the wake of rising Marxism–Leninism and communism in general.
Fundamental conservative ideas are grounded in Confucian values and strands of Chinese philosophy associated with Sun Yat-sen's teachings, a large centralized government which intervenes closely in the lives of individuals on both social and economic levels, and the construction of unified Sinocentric national identity.
By the end of Chiang Kai-shek’s presidency, the agenda of radical pro-unification via military force has slowly devolved into the desire for peaceful and strategic, albeit competitive coexistence rather than outright contention.
Over time, the latter strategy has consolidated into the One-China principle as a result of the 1992 Consensus, which proposed a unified entity comprising both Taiwan and the Mainland, while leaving the issue of representation open to interpretation.
From a comparative standpoint, conservatives derive economic and security benefits from communication with the PRC, while warning against Taiwan's isolation and insecurity implied under Taiwanese sovereignty.
This runs counter to Western political conservatism, which supports a small government that operates on the perimeter of social life in order to respect the liberty of citizens.
As such, conservative KMT policies may also be characterized by a focus on maintaining the traditions and doctrine of Confucian thought, namely reinforcing the morals of paternalism and patriarchy in Taiwan's society.
Similar to the threat of multiculturalism which governs one primary concern for western conservatives i.e. United States, KMT policies are against the integration of Aboriginal culture into the mainstream Chinese identity.
These three principles combine to make Taiwan a free, powerful, and prosperous nation, although they are selectively interpreted in a specific context which deviates from Sun Yat-sen's original intent.
However, most of his political ideas which were later adapted by his successors in governing Taiwan included equalization of land ownership, learning Chinese traditional morality through Confucian values, and the regulation of state capital by national corporations.
[45] As a result, the return of the KMT into power will likely be predicated on a more careful maintenance of pragmatic diplomacy which foreseeably involves drawing Taiwan closer to the PROC through a variety of methods, such as sharing social spaces in international institutions, making diplomatic visits, signing economic deals.
[47] Beijing's preoccupation with the process of “localization” stems from concerns over the ROC's move towards “De-Sinification” which would weaken the PRC's claim that people on both sides of the strait share common bond and heritage.
Moreover, China views current DPP president Tsai Ing-wen as a dangerous player who threatens the 1992 Consensus, blaming the KMT for mismanagement of domestic and international policy which led to their 2016 election loss.
In 2014, there was a controversy when he expressed his negationist views on Nanjing Massacre and Comfort women, sensitive issues in Korea and China, in the Japanese magazine SAPIO published by Shogakukan.
[49] the Taiwanese Localism Front, a radical anti-communist organization, is also referred to as the far-right; They are strongly opposed to China (PRC) and defend militarist policies.
[68] It is a neo-conservative movement of various Chinese traditions and has been regarded as containing religious overtones; it advocates for certain Confucianist elements of society – such as social, ecological, and political harmony[67] – to be applied in a contemporary context in synthesis with Western philosophies such as rationalism and humanism.
