Grounds for such action include war, invasion, rebellion, sedition, catastrophe (natural disasters), epidemic or "grave disturbances of the public order".

The declaration of suspension of guarantees grants jurisdiction over cases involving "crimes against the existence and organization of the state" to special military courts.

[2] Representatives of these five parties issued a manifesto in March 1982, decrying both communism and Christian democratic socialism and declaring that both ideologies had been rejected by the people via the ballot box.

The coalition leaders suggested that they were preparing to limit Christian democratic influence on the drafting of the constitution, and to exclude the PDC from participation in the interim government that was to be named by the Constituent Assembly.

During its existence (from April 1982 through December 1983), the Constituent Assembly came under pressure from a number of sources (most significantly, the United States government and the Salvadoran military).

At stake was the continuation of United States aid (both economic and military), without which El Salvador would have been hard-pressed to sustain its democratic transition in the face of growing military and political pressure from the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front-Revolutionary Democratic Front (Frente Farabundo Marti de Liberacion Nacional-Frente Democratico Revolucionario or FMLN-FDR), the leftist guerrilla (FMLN) and political (FDR) opposition groups which unified in 1981 in an effort to seize power by revolutionary means.

[2] El Salvador's military high command (alto mardo) recognized this reality, and lent its considerable influence to the cause of continued PDC participation in government.

The Christian Democrats had been brought into the juntas at the urging of reformist officers; by 1982 the PDC and the military had come to a practical understanding based on their shared interest in maintaining good relations with the United States, expanding political participation, improving economic conditions for the average Salvadoran and fending off the challenge from the Marxist left.

At the same time, the deputies voted to affirm the validity of the decrees issued by the junta governments (including those that enacted agrarian, banking, and foreign-commerce reforms).

It was reported that the United States and the Salvadoran High Command lobbied persuasively against D'Aubuisson's appointment, mainly on the grounds that his negative image outside El Salvador would complicate (if not preclude) the provision of substantial aid from Washington.

Apparently swayed by this argument, the members of the Constituent Assembly appointed Alvaro Magana Borja (a political moderate with ties to the military) to the post on April 26.

[2] Despite its defeat on the issue of the provisional presidency, Arena continued to hold the balance of power in El Salvador through its leadership of the conservative majority in the Constituent Assembly.

This action was interpreted by interested parties (in El Salvador and abroad) as a bid by the right to eliminate agrarian reform and to encourage the eviction of land recipients (an ongoing process at the time), although its extent was difficult to quantify; it led directly to a limitation by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee of the U.S. Congress on military and Economic Support Funds (ESF) aid to El Salvador.

[2] Although Arena's most important domestic constituency—the economic elite—continued to advocate the limitation (if not the elimination) of agrarian reform, it was clear that such efforts in the Constituent Assembly would have negative repercussions.

[2] In August 1982, in an effort to bring the areneros under control and to prevent them from sabotaging not only the reforms but the fledgling democratic system, Magana (apparently at the strong urging of the military chiefs and the United States) brought together representatives of Arena, the PDC and the PCN to negotiate a "basic platform of government".

Magana, lacking a political power base or constituency beyond the good will of the military, found it frustrating to try to exert authority over his cabinet ministers (particularly those drawn from the ranks of Arena).

The areneros (particularly Constituent Assembly president D'Aubuisson) saw this (not without justification) as an effort to diminish their influence in the government and sought to defeat the appointment through parliamentary maneuvering.

In light of the decline in the Arena coalition's standing and influence and the corresponding gains of the PDC and its moderate allies, eliminating the reforms altogether was ruled out.

Their major victory in this regard was the raising of the maximum allowable landholding under Phase II of the reform from 100 to 245 hectares, an action that addressed the concerns of some well-to-do landowners but that put a crimp in redistribution efforts by reducing the amount of land subject to expropriation.

The version finally approved by the assembly endorsed capital punishment only in cases covered by military law when the country was in a state of declared war.