Constructive vote of no confidence

Furthermore, as the German Empire had not been a parliamentary system, the politicians who had served in the pre-war Reichstag had little experience with coalition governments, which were an absolute necessity given the fractured political landscape.

He was a strongly conservative monarchist who frequently clashed with and tried to undermine the SPD[citation needed], the party that held the most seats in the Reichstag from 1919 to 1932.

All of the transitions under Reich President Friedrich Ebert of the SPD (in office 1919 to 1925) were made collegially with the cooperation of the Reichstag.

To prevent the type of instability seen on the Reich level during the Weimar Republic and taking a cue from the Prussian model, two provisions were included in the 1949 German constitution, the Basic Law (Grundgesetz) They stipulate that Bundeskanzler (Federal Chancellor), as the function is now called, may be removed from office by majority vote of the Bundestag ("Federal Diet", the German Federal Parliament) only if a prospective successor also has the support of a majority: As a result, the failure of a motion of confidence does not automatically force either the resignation of the cabinet or a new election.

At the same time, the Bundestag can't be dissolved unless a motion of no confidence has passed; this was meant as a way to prevent the incumbent Chancellor from strategically calling a new election (such as when the party or coalition they belong to is higher in the polls).

This mechanism of triggering early elections was used three times at the federal level, in 1972 after Willy Brandt narrowly survived an attempt to unseat him, in 1983 after Helmut Kohl wished to cement his ascension via constructive vote of no confidence (the FDP had switched from supporting Helmut Schmidt and the SPD to backing Kohl and the CDU/CSU two years after the 1980 German federal election) and in 2005 when Gerhard Schröder wished to obtain a new mandate from the electorate in the face of falling poll numbers, criticism from members of his own party and the loss in the 2005 North Rhine-Westphalia state election (a state his party had governed since 1966).

While Carlo Schmid is generally considered the main contributor to this constitutional innovation, the concept was actually introduced after World War I in the Free State of Prussia.

On 27 April 1972, an attempt to oust Chancellor Willy Brandt (SPD) in favour of opposition leader Rainer Barzel (CDU) failed by only two votes.

This came as a surprise since it was known that several members of the SPD-FDP coalition strongly opposed Brandt's Ostpolitik and the government no longer had a clear majority after several deputies either switched over to the opposition or announced they would vote for the no-confidence motion.

The law on Bundestag Rules of Procedure [de] specifies that the Chancellor is elected in a secret ballot,[9] which applies in the motion of no confidence as well.

In June 1973, CDU member Julius Steiner admitted to Der Spiegel magazine to have abstained from voting.

However, as the government was no longer backed by a majority in parliament, on 22 September, Chancellor Brandt proposed a Motion of confidence to the Bundestag.

Still, the action triggered an appeal by four deputies to the Federal Constitutional Court, which, in a somewhat helpless ruling that February, upheld the move.

The court emphasized this was only acceptable if the Chancellor has reason to believe he cannot continue to effectively govern with the current balance of power.

It decided Kohl could believe this since the FDP was not only deeply divided by the change of coalition but had already agreed to early elections, meaning in theory that it no longer had to support the government.

A very similar system to the German one was adopted in the new Constitution of Spain of 1978 for the national Cortes (parliament) and also came into force in territorial assemblies (parliaments/assemblies of autonomous communities).

Despite Spanish constitutional history being very different from that of Germany (and Spain deciding to have the monarchy protected by an entrenched clause while Germany had been a Republic since 1919), the German Basic Law was seen as "success model" at the time and this is just one of several provisions the framers of the Spanish constitution lifted wholesale from the German model.

If the censure motion carries, the replacement candidate is deemed to have the confidence of the Congress and automatically ascends as Prime Minister.

[14]Under the October 1989 democratic revision of the 1949 Constitution, the National Assembly of Hungary could not remove the Prime Minister of Hungary unless a prospective successor was nominated (and elected) at the same time: Article 39A (1): In March 2009 the prime minister Ferenc Gyurcsány (Hungarian Socialist Party, MSZP) announced he would hand over his position to a politician with a higher support of the parliament parties.

The opposition Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ) refused most candidates for the post proposed by the MSZP, but on 30 March 2009, Gordon Bajnai managed to get the backing of both parties.

By a vote of no confidence the Knesset (parliament) did not elect new prime minister but only proposed a formateur: a presumptive nominee charged with seeking to form a new government.

The Constitution of Albania (1998 as amended in 2008 and 2012) stipulates also that only constructive vote of no confidence may be adopted by the absolute majority of the unicameral Assembly (parliament) deputies.

[20] According to the Constitution of Slovenia (1991 as amended in 1997, 2000, 2003, 2004, 2006 and 2013) the National Assembly (Državni zbor, lower chamber of the parliament) may pass a motion of no confidence in the Government only by electing a new prime minister.

(3) Moreover, the King may, in the event of the resignation of the federal Government, dissolve the Chamber of Representatives after having received its agreement expressed by the absolute majority of its members.

A prime minister faced with a vote of no confidence must either resign immediately or request a dissolution of parliament and fresh elections.

In such circumstances, it was often the case that the sitting prime minister would be unpopular with parliamentarians but also might not have a viable successor who could have a better command of the parliament.