The First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir Dudley Pound, acting on information that German ships, including German battleship Tirpitz, were moving to intercept, ordered the covering force, based on the Allied battleships HMS Duke of York and USS Washington away from the convoy and told the convoy to scatter.

Because of vacillation by Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW, German armed forces high command), the Tirpitz raid never materialised.

[2][3] The convoy was the first large joint Anglo-American naval operation under British command; in Churchill's view this encouraged a more careful approach to fleet movements.

[8] During Operation Barbarossa, the German war against the USSR, the British and American governments agreed to send unconditional aid to their Soviet ally.

[13] The battleships Scharnhorst, Gneisenau and the heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen were also sent to Arctic waters but fell victim to Allied air attacks and had to turn back for repairs.

The Germans had bases along the Norwegian coast, which meant, until escort carriers became available, Allied convoys had to be sailed through these areas without adequate defence against aircraft and submarine attack.

[14] British naval intelligence in June reported Unternehmen Rösselsprung (Operation Knight's Move), the German plan to use their big ships to attack the next convoy, east of Bear Island.

[16] Allied covering forces would be without air support, 1,000 mi (1,600 km) from their base and with the destroyers too short on fuel to escort a damaged ship to harbour.

[13] The Admiralty issued instructions on 27 June, which allowed the convoy to be turned back, temporarily to shorten the distance to the nearest Allied base.

[19] The senior officer of the escort (SOE), Commander Jack Broome, preferred to stay in the low visibility on the original route and to make ground to the eastward.

The heavy covering force was shadowed for a short period while north-east of Iceland on 1 July, while the cruiser screen was refuelling at Seidisfjord.

In view of the uncertainty of the two German ships' positions, Hamilton decided to continue to provide close cover with the cruiser squadron and to pass east of Bear Island.

The Kriegsmarine also had two battle groups in Norwegian ports, Force I (Drontheim-Gruppe) consisting of the battleship Tirpitz, the cruiser Hipper and the destroyers Karl Galster, Friedrich Ihn, Hans Lody, Theodor Riedel with the torpedo boats T 7 and T 15.

[23] On 16 June, the cruisers Lützow and Scheer took part in a joint naval and air exercise simulating an attack on Convoy PQ 17 and its escort.

[25] Many of the torpedo-bombers had been hurriedly transferred from other theatres and retrained from conventional bombing, as part of Hitler's demand for greater action against the Arctic convoys.

The route was longer than earlier convoys, since the ice allowed for a passage north of Bear Island and an evasive detour in the Barents Sea.

Since it was doubtful if she could face heavy weather, it was decided to transfer her to the fuelling position north-east of Jan Mayen in exchange for the RFA Aldersdale.

[29] On the morning of 4 July, a Heinkel He 115, from Küstenfliegergruppe 906, hit the Liberty ship SS Christopher Newport, around 35 nmi (40 mi; 65 km) north-east of Bear Island, at 75°49′N 22°15′E / 75.817°N 22.250°E / 75.817; 22.250.

At 21:23, the Admiralty, in a message prefixed "Immediate", ordered the convoy to disperse and proceed to Russian ports independently owing to threat from surface ships.

[39] Prior to issuing the orders, Pound visited Whitehall and consulted an intelligence officer, Lieutenant Commander Norman Denning, to confirm that Tirpitz had left Altentfjord.

Among the losses that day were SS Pan Kraft, Washington, Carlton, Honomu, the Commodore's flagship River Afton, Empire Byron and Peter Kerr.

[46] In the voyage to the Russian ports, some of the ships and lifeboat craft took refuge along the frozen coast of Novaya Zemlya, landing at Matochkin.

[48] Many of the ships' locations were unknown, in spite of searches by Coastal Command aircraft, which had proceeded to north Russia after their patrols and by minesweepers and corvettes.

Despite the help provided by the material delivered, Convoy PQ 17 worsened Soviet–Allied relations over the short term, with the Soviets never acknowledging the efforts of Allied merchant seaman or sailors in either navy.

[54] Admiral Dan Gallery, USN, serving in Iceland at that time, called Convoy PQ 17 "a shameful page in naval history".

[51] At a conference with Hitler, Raeder stated, "...our submarines and aircraft, which totally destroyed the last convoy, have forced the enemy to give up this route temporarily...".

Pound said nothing could be done until better Russian air cover was arranged, after which Kharlamov criticised the order to withdraw the cruisers from Convoy PQ 17.

Pound angrily admitted that Convoy PQ 17 was scattered on his order while Maisky stated that "even British admirals make mistakes".

It concentrated on Allied blunders and shortcomings, alleging that Broome's decision to withdraw his destroyers was the primary cause of the disaster to the convoy.

Broome won his case and was awarded £40,000 in damages and secured the withdrawal of all copies of the offending book from circulation (it has since been republished, with corrections).