On 13 November 1941, the commander-in-chief of the Kriegsmarine, Großadmiral (Grand Admiral) Erich Raeder, told Hitler that, owing to the extreme weather and the lack of air reconnaissance, the prospects of the small number of U-boats in the Arctic Ocean were poor.

[1] Before September 1941 the British had dispatched 450 aircraft, 22,000 long tons (22,000 t) of rubber, 3,000,000 pairs of boots and stocks of tin, aluminium, jute, lead and wool.

[2] The British Government Code and Cypher School (GC&CS) based at Bletchley Park housed a small industry of code-breakers and traffic analysts.

By June 1941, the German Enigma machine Home Waters (Heimish) settings used by surface ships and U-boats could quickly be read.

In 1941, B-Dienst read signals from the Commander in Chief Western Approaches informing convoys of areas patrolled by U-boats, enabling the submarines to move into "safe" zones.

[5] In winter, polar ice can form as far south as 50 mi (80 km) off the North Cape and in summer it can recede to Svalbard.

British convoys to Russia had received little attention since they averaged only eight ships each and the long Arctic winter nights negated even the limited Luftwaffe effort that was available.

The round trip to Murmansk for warships was three weeks and each convoy needed a cruiser and two destroyers, which severely depleted the Home Fleet.

[13] Lancastrian Prince Alchiba Llanstephan Castle Trehata Esneh Black Ranger Alma-Ata New Westminster City Rodina Stary Bolshevik Sevzaples Budyonny — Mossovet — — — Sukhona — — The heavy cruiser, HMS London, escorted by the destroyer Active, had carried RAF personnel and a British–American diplomatic mission with Lord Beaverbrook and Averell Harriman, for talks in Moscow, to Archangelsk from 22 to 27 September 1941.

[17][18] Distant cover was provided by units of the Home Fleet, which were engaged in Operation EJ, air attacks on ships off the Norwegian coast.

Two Soviet freighters, one of which, Sukhona, was over 20 years old and referred to by Electra's crew as 'Dirty Joe', were unable to keep up and dropped out of the convoy; both arrived safely after an independent voyage.

Victorious was pitching in the stormy seas and an Albacore was severely damaged, landing with its torpedo; the crew escaped unhurt.

Aircraft from 817 NAS attacked, 10 nmi (19 km; 12 mi) north of Bodø, combining low-altitude and low dive-bombing for no loss.

One ship was sunk and two Albacores crashed on landing, one having been damaged by anti-aircraft fire wounding the Telegraphist Air Gunner.

[23][b] In the winter darkness the Luftwaffe had great difficulty in finding Allied convoys, which made attacks on Murmansk and the railway south more practical.

[23] To protect return convoys and sweep for mines, the commander of the Home Fleet, John Tovey, established a force of ocean-going, Halcyon-class minesweepers at the Kola naval base, which had the speed, armament and anti-submarine capacity similar to that of Flower-class corvettes.

The fleet oiler RFA Aldersdale had arrived with Operation Dervish (21–31 August 1941), to stay at Kola to fuel ships for the return journey.

On 13 November 1941, the commander-in-chief of the Kriegsmarine, Großadmiral (Grand Admiral) Erich Raeder, told Hitler that, owing to the extreme weather and the lack of air reconnaissance, the prospects of the small number of U-boats in the Arctic Ocean were poor.