Dehousing

The strategy was proposed via a memorandum on March 30, 1942, by Professor Frederick Lindemann, Baron Cherwell, the British government's chief scientific adviser.

The paper argued that from the analysis of the reaction of the British population to the Blitz, the demolition of people's houses was the most effective way to affect their morale, even more than killing relatives.

Since November 1941, the RAF had been husbanding its resources and awaiting the introduction of large numbers of four-engined heavy bombers[b] and the GEE radio-navigational device into frontline service.

Careful analysis of the effects of raids on Birmingham, Hull and elsewhere have shown that, on the average, one ton of bombs dropped on a built-up area demolishes 20–40 dwellings and turns 100–200 people out of house and home.

Working from a damage analysis inflicted on British cities, a bomber force of 4,000 aircraft was calculated to be able to destroy the 43 German towns with a population of more than 100,000.

The Chief of the Air Staff, Sir Charles Portal argued that with such a force RAF Bomber Command could win the war in six months.

Not all were convinced, and when Churchill expressed his doubts, the Air Staff said that even if Germany was not knocked out of the war, it would be weakened sufficiently to allow British armed forces back into Continental Europe.

[9] Thus, the Secretary of State for Air, Sir Archibald Sinclair and Sir Charles Portal were delighted by the dehousing paper, as it offered support to them in their battle to save the strategic bomber offensive, which had been under attack from others in the high command, who thought that the resources put into Bomber Command were damaging the other branches of the armed services with little to show for it.

[12][13] In reply to Tizard, Cherwell stated the calculations were for the Prime Minister's benefit, not for statistical analysis, and that despite a difference between the numbers and what was really achieved, there would be catastrophic effects.

In his Bomber Command, Max Hastings characterised the debate between the two sides as not being whether bombing could "raze [Germany] to the ground" but whether it was the most effective allocation of resources.

The study of the effects of bombing on Hull and Birmingham was published on 8 April by Professors Bernal and Zuckerman after Cherwell's paper had been presented.

Their work, the "Hull and Birmingham Survey", had actually found that although there was anxiety as a result of the raids, there was no mass anti-social behaviour and "no measurable effect on the health of either town".