Democracy promotion by the United States
Democracy promotion by the United States aims to encourage governmental and non-governmental actors to pursue political reforms that will lead ultimately to democratic governance.
As the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) is an area of the world vital to American interests[1] yet generally entrenched in non-democratic, authoritarian rule,[2][3] it has been the subject of increasing interest on the part of the American government and democracy promoters, particularly after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, with many viewing democratic transition as essential to regional stability and international security.
[4] American efforts to promote democracy in the Middle East and North Africa are generally characterized by top-down and bottom-up democratization strategies, which can be pursued simultaneously.
The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) also places a priority on promoting democratic transition and good governance in accordance with overall U.S. foreign policy objectives.
[12] Although the definition of the "Middle East" is contested among international relations scholars, some have concluded that it encompasses an Arab core with a non-Arab periphery including Israel, Iran and Turkey.
In the context of the MENA region, the impetus to direct American democracy promotion through international non-governmental NGOs stems from suspicion of the motives of the U.S.
The notion of development emerged in the 1940s and 1950s out of the post-World War II context in which a new international economic order was established, the United States made contributions to European reconstruction, and attention to the post-colonial Third World increased.
[30] In the MENA region, however, the United States did little to rupture relations with authoritarian regimes and largely avoided paying significant attention to human rights and democratization.
The Middle East was not excluded from this discussion, with some[33] calling for increased American democracy promotion as a means of encouraging more peaceful relations with Israel and moderating extremists, while not going so far as to destabilize friendly autocratic regimes.
[39] This resulted in a ramping-up of diplomatic rhetoric on the necessity of democratization and political reform in the Middle East and an increase in funding for democracy promotion in the region.
In one segment of her speech she outlined several aspects of the Bush administration's view of democratization in the region, including denying that democracy is being imposed from the outside, stressing that democracy would bring peace rather than chaos, pressing leaders in the region to commit to the democratization process, and asserting the incompatibility of terrorism and democracy: A significant democratic stirring in the MENA region ensued from 2004 to 2006, marked by demonstrations, open calls for reform, and enhanced activity on the part of pro-democracy activists, yet U.S. pressure on regimes to implement top-down political reform had declined significantly by mid-2006 following strong parliamentary gains by the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood in 2005 elections and a Hamas victory in the 2006 Palestinian elections.
[44] One criticism leveled at the Bush administration's democracy agenda is that short-term strategic and diplomatic imperatives such as cooperation on counter-terrorism, assistance in creating stability in Iraq, and support for the peace process ultimately trumped or diluted the push for reform.
[45] Other critics, such as retired general and former presidential candidate Wesley Clark, doubted the effectiveness of American military engagement as a tactic for democracy promotion given that reformers in the region "don't want to have their own hopes and dreams subordinated to the political agenda of the United States," and he attributed signs of progress in the MENA region to the National Endowment for Democracy and international organizations who "have been working with and strengthening reform-minded elements in these countries for years.
"[47] In his September 2010 address to the UN General Assembly, Obama expressed a commitment to engaging with civil society, yet said: "The ultimate success of democracy in the world won't come because the United States dictates it; it will come because individual citizens demand a say in how they are governed.
[50] Some analysts stress that the Arab regimes have shown themselves to be increasingly intransigent with regards to reform in recent years,[51] a trend that could require a re-evaluation of U.S. policy and strategy.
[54] Until recently, scholars have generally agreed with international relations professor Abraham Lowenthal that U.S. attempts to export democracy have been "negligible, often counterproductive, and only occasionally positive".
Drake argued that this was contradictory because international law defines intervention as "dictatorial interference in the affairs of another state for the purpose of altering the condition of things".
[70] American democracy promotion priorities are outlined in specific terms by U.S. government bodies tasked with funding projects, as well as government-established, private granting institutions.
Criticism focuses in general on the following challenges for American DG efforts: effectiveness, aid prioritization, selectivity, financing, and discourse and objectivity.
[76] Although American democracy promotion efforts in the MENA region take a more balanced top-down/bottom-up strategy than those of the European Union and engage in more politically sensitive areas such as state institution building,[77] some question the assumption that pushing for liberalizing reforms is a worthwhile endeavor given that regimes can easily de-liberalize and reforms are often cosmetic and do not alter the real balance of effective governing power.
[78] Furthermore, promoting DG in the MENA region operating on the assumption that proper counsel and expert advice can guide a government to reform ignores the possibility that regimes are not necessarily "neutral apparatus representing public interests" and may be resistant to relinquishing power.
"Dishonest" democratization involving superficial political liberalization can serve as a facade for continued authoritarianism and repression of civil society,[80] and even help reinforce and stabilize autocratic regimes.
Heba Raouf Ezzat questions the utility of promoting women's involvement and normalization of authoritarian regimes: "In Egypt, Morocco, Bahrain, Qatar and other countries the official support of women as ministers or executives or even judges serves only to obscure the rising authoritarianism of the regimes that is veiled by soft democratic rhetoric limited to the vocal level or reduced to trivial changes that are curbed by logistic and legal details.
"[94] Likewise, in their analysis of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood's parliamentary experience, Samer Shehata and Joshua Stacher point to the Brotherhood's reformist agenda and conclude that "the bloc's political practice—its proactive study of political issues and use of parliamentary procedure to hold the government's feet to the fire—has the potential to strengthen permanently the institution of Parliament vis-à-vis the executive led by President Husni Mubarak.
"[95] Larry Diamond lists American and European dialogue with moderate Islamists as key to democracy promotion, suggesting a bargain in which Western powers would press for Islamist parties' right to participate in free and fair elections in exchange for an unambiguous commitment to democracy and equal rights for women and religious minorities, in addition to recognition of Israel.
[103] Noam Chomsky argues that "U.S. democratic rhetoric and undemocratic substance have a long history,"[104] and the United States only supports democracy "if and only if it conforms to U.S. economic and strategic objectives.
"[109] According to Mitchell, the projects USAID pursues are built on a discourse subservient to American political and economic interests and can potentially do more harm than good for Egyptians.
