[3] Even at this stage, the seemingly counterproductive nature of many of its attacks led to speculation (encouraged by FIS members abroad) that the group had been infiltrated by Algerian secret services.
During this period, judging from its London-based magazine Al-Ansar, it worked out ever broader ideological justifications for killing civilians, with the help of fatwas from such figures as Abu Qatada.
[5] Militants began "to desert in droves":[5] Mustapha Kartali, Ali Benhadjar, and Hassan Hattab's factions all refused to recognize Zitouni's leadership starting around late 1995, although they would not formally break away until somewhat later.
[citation needed] On May 31, 1996 Al-Ansar suspended publication demanding an explanation from the GIA, and a week later it and two other Islamists groups (including the al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya in Egypt) announced their withdrawal of support for Zitouni.
[5] In the summer of 1996 the GIA finally released a video of two friends of the victims "`confessing` to the plot and humbly requesting summary execution for themselves.
[citation needed] Djamel Zitouni had earned notoriety for such acts as the killing of the seven Monks of Tibhirine in March, but his successor would prove to be far bloodier.
Analysis of a bomb with a failed trigger mechanism made it possible to identify a conspirator, Khaled Kelkal, who was shot and killed by French gendarmes on 29 September 1995.
[11] After the death of Zitouni in 1998, prior to the World Cup, France in collaboration with other European countries launched a vast preventive operation against the GIA.