On 1 March 1944: 915,721 personnel[7] 300,000+ personnel (by spring 1944)[8] 3,235 guns and mortars[9] 1,344 anti-tank guns[9] 150,000-180,000 personnel (by spring 1944)[8] 30 operational tanks[10] 30 operational assault guns[11] 60 operational armored vehicles in total GermanyFrieser: 41,907 killed[14]157,888 wounded[14]51,161 missing[14] Total: 250,956 combat casualties[14] OKH Reports: 379,688 combat casualties[15] Grylev: Second phase The Dnieper–Carpathian offensive (Russian: Днепровско-Карпатская операция, romanized: Dneprovsko-Karpatskaya operatsiya), also known in Soviet historical sources as the Liberation of Right-bank Ukraine (Russian: Освобождение Правобережной Украины, romanized: Osvobozhdeniye Pravoberezhnoy Ukrainy), was a strategic offensive executed by the Soviet 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Ukrainian Fronts, along with the 2nd Belorussian Front, against the German Army Group South, Army Group A and elements of Army Group Center, and fought from late December 1943 to early May 1944.

[20][21] Even worse were equipment losses, with thousands of precious tanks, assault guns, artillery and trucks being lost, principally through their abandonment in the spring mud.

As the Red Army approached the borders of Hungary and Romania, both countries mobilized their full resources and committed a combined total of 25 fresh divisions.

The German command took into account the important strategic position of the right bank of Ukraine and Crimea, as areas covering the approaches to southern Poland and the Balkans and ensuring control over the central and western parts of the Black Sea.

By the end of 1943, the German forces operating in Ukraine were driven back to the line of Ovruch, Radomyshl, Kanev, Bashtina, Marganets, Kachachrovka.

[40] Both Manstein and Kleist demanded that their forces be allowed to pull back to more defensible positions, however, they were overruled by Hitler who ordered his armies to stand where they were.

In accordance with the general military-political task of completely clearing the Soviet land from the German forces and restoring the USSR's state borders from the Barents Sea to the Black Sea, the Soviet Supreme Command, Stavka, for the winter of 1943/44 planned a series of major offensive operations- near Leningrad and Novgorod, in Belarus, on the right-bank Ukraine and in the Crimea.

[44] In the upcoming winter offensive, the main efforts of the Red Army forces were concentrated in the south with the task of liberating right-Bank Ukraine and Crimea.

To fulfill the goals, the Soviet command utilized the troops of the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th Ukrainian fronts, Separate Coastal Army, the Black Sea Fleet, the Azov Flotilla, as well as the partisans operating in the rear of the Germans.

According to the plan, which was formed by December 1943, the 1st Ukrainian Front was to crush the north wing of Army Group South by a blow from Kiev to Mogilev-Podolsky.

[45] At the same time, the 2nd, 3rd and 4th Ukrainian fronts with blows from the north, east and south were supposed to surround and destroy the Krivoi Rog-Nikopol group of the Germans.

The troops of the 3rd and 4th Ukrainian fronts would strike two converging blows in the directions of Nikopol, Novo-Vorontsovka and were to defeat the Nikopol-Krivoi Rog grouping of the Germans, then to develop an attack towards Nikolaev, Odessa and free the entire Black Sea coast.

[46] The Soviet partisans were given the task of strengthening the attacks on German communications, road junctions, crossings, their rear garrisons, thereby assisting the Red Army.

Retained Soviet bridgeheads on the right bank of the Dnieper were the starting areas for the concentration of troops, military equipment, materiel needed for the impending offensive.

On the right-bank Ukraine there are many rivers flowing mainly from the northwest to the southeast: for example, the Dnieper, Southern Bug, Ingulets, Dniester, Prut and Siret.

In general, the vast territory of the right-bank Ukraine allowed the Soviets to launch broad offensive operations and use all types of troops, including large armored and mechanized formations.

Usually, in the hot summer the river was no bigger than a brook that can be easily forded, but in February 1944, after a three-week thaw, the Gniloy Tikich flooded to a width of 20–30 meters.

It included the following operations:[17] The offensive was launched on December 24, 1943, by Vatutin's 1st Ukrainian Front, with attacks against the German 4th Panzer Army, to the west and south-west of Kiev.

The blow of the 1st Ukrainian Front was struck at the most sensitive place of Army Group South – its northern flank, which threatened to cut off its main forces from the paths leading to Germany.

To close the gaps in their defense and to stop the Soviet offensive on this sector, the Germans had to urgently transfer 12 divisions of the 1st Panzer Army from the southern Ukraine to this area.

The battle was waged under incredibly brutal conditions, with Russian POWs shot by the Germans during the retreat, and Konev admitted to allowing his cavalry to massacre troops attempting surrender with upraised hands.

[65] However, it eventually destroyed the salient projecting around Kryvyi Rih and Nikopol, costing the Germans the important mining operations there as well as nearly encircling the defenders.

[66] The Soviet deception measures were successful and most Germans were surprised when, on March 4, the 1st Ukrainian Front–commanded by Zhukov after Vatutin's death–launched the Proskurov–Chernovtsy offensive (see Kamenets-Podolsky pocket), with a fierce artillery barrage.

[43] Due to the extremely muddy conditions, it was hard for the defending Germans to remain mobile, but the Soviet forces had adequate supplies of tracked tanks and trucks, giving them the advantage.

The same day, Hollidt managed to break out from his encirclement – primarily because Malinovsky had divided his forces at Nikolaev[67] – and was able to improvise a defensive line on the Bug by March 21.

Now, the southern group of German forces would have to use the long roundabout route through the Balkans, with all of the supplies being rerouted over the Romanian railroads, which were in poor condition.

To deal with the crises and to stabilize the front-lines in western Ukraine, the Wehrmacht was forced to redirect huge amounts of men, equipment, and reinforcements to that area.

These resources were desperately necessary to prepare the forces in France for the upcoming Allied invasion and whose redirection critically weakened Army Group Center.

[18] First, conditions were created to develop attacks in the Lublin direction to the flank and rear of Army Group Center, which were accomplished during the Lublin–Brest offensive.

In the course of the operation the Vinnitsa, Volyn, Zhytomir, Kiev, Kirovohrad, Rivne, Khmelnytskyi (Khmelnitskiy) and parts of Poltava Oblasts, and the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic were taken by the Red Army.