The United States had a longstanding strategic doctrine in the Middle East not to let any country become so powerful that it could control the entire Gulf Region's oil supply.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff favored exploring dialogue with Saddam, but US Secretary of Defense Les Aspin, the CIA, and the US State Department wanted a harder line.
However, it was agreed that the administration would give political to support to the Iraqi National Congress and would continue the no-fly zones protecting Kurdish and Shia populations in Iraq.
Following the establishment of the northern safe haven in 1991, intended to provide humanitarian relief and stem the flow of Kurdish refugees into neighboring countries, the region became a secure base for opposition movements.
This support included the provision of funds, armaments, and logistical aid to foster an insurgency that would weaken Saddam Hussein’s regime and pave the way for an internal coup d’état.
[9] Anthony Lake, National Security Advisor under President Clinton, later acknowledged that while containment was officially framed as upholding UN resolutions, it was, in effect, a tactical tool to achieve the broader strategic goal of regime change.
Finally, punitive military action was ruled out on the grounds that Iran's retaliatory capabilities were considered too great, and the benefits of the strikes were too uncertain.
[16] However, the United Arab Emirates by the late 1990s told US officials that they thought that Saddam was meeting his international obligations and that containment of Iraq was no longer necessary.
[19] Articles in Foreign Affairs[20] and for the Cato Institute[21] in 1994 criticized dual containment as "shot through with logical flaws and practical inconsistencies and is based on faulty geopolitical premises" and one that required "a prolonged U.S. military presence in the Persian Gulf region."
Troops were stationed in Saudi Arabia, an area that many in the region regard as "holy soil," which offended many locals and is cited by Osama bin Laden as one reason for his hatred against the United States policies and part of his motivation for the September 11 attacks.
Pressed by the American Israel Public Affairs Committee and other pro-Israel forces,[22] Clinton toughened up the policy in the spring of 1995 by imposing an economic embargo on Iran.
Critics have argued that this tactical focus on containment and covert regime change came at the expense of a coherent strategic vision for Iraq’s future.
Furthermore, the lack of explicit acknowledgment of regime change as a policy objective created diplomatic tensions, particularly with coalition partners such as Turkey and Saudi Arabia, who had concerns about the broader implications of U.S. actions in Iraq.