East Sumatra revolution
Across 25 "native states", many sultanates were overthrown and mass killing of members of the aristocratic families were performed by armed pergerakan groups (Indonesian nationalists).
[1] To the opportunistic pergerakan militants (especially Communist Party of Indonesia leaders Abdoe'lxarim M. S. and Luat Siregar), the revolutionary movement was seen as one of the means for East Sumatra to be freed from colonial overlordship and to join the larger Indonesian National Revolution.
[8] One example was the East Sumatra Association, which was created in 1938 by Dutch-educated Malays and was later led by Dr Tengku Mansur (who was connected to the Asahan royal family).
The national movement then slowly reached out to small farmers of the tobacco-growing area, which eventually provided the rudiments of an important rural base for the two nationalist parties, GERINDO and PARINDRA in East Sumatra.
Besides raising voices that disagreed with the Dutch repression and Malay aristocracy, the two parties also played important roles in initiating and mobilizing resources to support the 1946 East Sumatra social revolution.
[8] Many Japanese officials managed to exploit food and labour supplies from the peasantry through the kerajaan hierarchy and that had increased the amount of economic pressure faced by the farming population of East Sumatra.
[9] Furthermore, the policies adopted by the Japanese were seen as a continuance of Dutch support for the kerajaan that caused nationalists to hold stronger negative feelings towards the Sultans and Malay aristocrats.
Brondgeest decided to act independently from British and Japanese with local Ambonese and Menadonese as police force to control Medan and Republican movement.
[10] Many of the Japanese-trained unemployed pemuda of ex-Giyugun were then recruited by Abdoe'lxarim M. S. – the executor of the former Badan Oentoek Membantor Pertahanan Asia (Body for Assisting the Defence of Asia / BOMPA) property, who fed them BOMPA rice-stocks, and were then organised into a broader Persatuan Pemuda Latihan (Trained Youth Association) which include police, soldiers, and officials.
On 23 September, the senior ex-Giyugun officer, First Lieutenant Achmad Tahir issued a meeting for all Japanese-trained Pemuda in Asrama Rensheikei.
They plan to contact with Aminuddin Nazir of Inoue's coastal guard and by evening Badan Pemuda Indonesia or BPI was formed under Achmad Tahir as First Chairman.
[10] By 10 October 1945, Tentara Keamanan Rakyat or TKR of East Sumatra was formed with Achmad Tahir as Commander, Soetjipto as Chief-of-Staff, Capt.
On 13 October 1945, supposedly an incident happened where one of the Dutch sentries torn off and trampled a red and white pin worn by a child.
[17] Nonetheless, the pemuda of East Sumatra managed to acquire some weapons that were left over by Japanese soldiers after the surrender and used them to confront the British in the south of Medan on 10 December 1945.
On 3 March 1946, thousands of armed pemuda surrounded the palace in Tanjung Balai in response to the wide dissemination of reports that claimed that the kerajaan had formed a Comité van Ontvangst (reception committee) to welcome the Dutch.
The sympathy that Malay aristocrats had for the Dutch and the threats that they represented to the independence of Indonesia were commonly seen as the two main reasons for the occurrence of this violent event.
There were three main objectives associated with the revolution that involved different groups of people: firstly, to seize Malay aristocrats and their principal supporters so as to thwart their plans for the return of the Dutch; secondly, gain control of kerajaan the Malay sultanates' wealth in order to sustain the expenses for the national struggle and thirdly, to exercise political and societal changes in accordance to the Marxist intellectuals who were involved in the event.
The national revolution also reflected a great diversity of interests from almost all sections of Sumatran society and several complex issues behind the fight for independence in East Sumatra.
On 3 March 1946, thousands of armed pemuda surrounded the palace in Tanjung Balai in response to the wide dissemination of reports that claimed that the kerajaan had formed a Comité van Ontvangst (reception committee) to welcome the Dutch.
[22] In the late February 1946, Major Ferguson, part of British intelligence, was closely linked with political machinations in East Sumatra.
"In the case of the plantation economy in this region, this foreign labour was predominantly from the relatively overcrowded island of Java: by the 1930s, 43 percent of the population was 'Javanese'.
[29] Those aristocrats were able to accumulate significant wealth by "leas[ing] wide tracts of land, the disposal rights over which frequently had lain traditionally with the village, to foreign companies..." and seizing most of the profits.
[31] Most of them used to collaborate with the Japanese occupiers as administrative personnel and they were motivated to join this revolution so as to promote the political ideology of nationalism as well as to continue their leadership during the post-war period.
[32] Many scholars including Anthony Reid and Mohammad Said have highlighted the importance of these people in initiating and executing the 1946 social revolution in East Sumatra.
[6] The revolutionaries, including the armed Pemuda, were able to fight the Dutch return with a common unifying goal in 1945, but there were insufficient resources to last through a longer period than 1947.
With the support of these Malays, the Dutch attempted to establish a federal Indonesia consisting of a Dutch-supported State of East Sumara (Indonesian: Negara Sumatera Timur, NST).
[34] The threat felt by the Chinese also motivated them to co-operate with the Malay aristocrats, most of the Simalungun rajas, some Karo chieftains and the Dutch in creating the NST.
Dr Tengku Mansur (a member of the Asahan royal family) was selected as head of state and the NST lasted from December 1947 to August 1950.
The short-lived state was viewed with suspicion, and Dr Tengku Mansur eventually surrendered authority to the republic in August 1950,[35] which backed by military for the stability framework.
The rise of UMNO gave political voice for the popular support commanded by the conservative elite, inseparable to events in Indonesia, and has been beneficial for long-term British presence.
