Eli Berman (born 1960) is the Research Director for International Security Studies at the UC Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation and since 2010 a Professor of economics at the University of California, San Diego.
He further argues that the economics of religion can provide explanations for the way in which "radical religious communities organize mechanisms to control defection in order to successfully conduct mutual aid—which they tend to be quite effective at.
[2] By way of counter example he examines the case of the militant Jewish organisation Gush Emunim Underground, which ultimately over-reached its ability to sustain a group without defections, by carrying out attacks on civilians while neglecting to induce the necessary loyalty in its members and political base through various welfare measures.
He writes that the Taliban are a direct descendant of the nineteenth-century Deobandi movement in India, which opposed the British colonial rule and, among other things, established a system of religious schools.
[7] In his 2009 book, Berman writes that "four radical religious organizations, Hezbollah, Hamas, the Taliban, and the Mahdi Army, continue to surprise established militaries with both their resilience and their lethality."
Berman's book seeks to address the question: "Why are religious radicals, who often start out appearing benign and charitable and generally avoid conflict, so effective at violence when they choose to engage in it?
All three groups changed their ideologies drastically: Hamas in choosing armed conflict, the Taliban in deciding to protect Bin Laden and Hezbollah in shifting from a rebellion against Israeli occupation to an ethnic militia/political party after Israel's withdrawal from South Lebanon in 2000.
In a 2000 NBER paper, Berman describes Ultra-Orthodox Jews as "a fascinating and fast-growing sect which has held virtual veto power over [Israeli] public policy for more than two decades.
In an interview, Berman explains the findings as "insurgencies are very small organizations which need very few fighters to keep them going, and are often not constrained by a lack of recruits—and even if they were there's nothing to stop young men from working by day and planting roadside bombs by night.