The concept is especially relevant in evolutionary game theory, where the different methods of equilibrium selection respond to different ideas of what equilibria will be stable and persistent for one player to play even in the face of deviations (and mutations) of the other players.
Equilibria stipulation actions that are not Nash Equilibrium strategies in the stage game are still supported.
When the participants are in a coordinate game where the players do not have a chance to discuss their strategies beforehand, focal point is a solution that somehow stands out as the natural answer.
For example, in an experiment conducted in 1990 by Mehta et al. (1994), the researchers let the participants answer a questionnaire, which contained the question "name a year" or "name a city in England".
However, when they had the incentive to coordinate - the participants were told they would be paid if they managed to answer the question the same way as an anonymous partner - most of them chose 1990 (the year at the time) and London (the largest city in the UK).
These are not the first answers that came to their minds, but they are the best bets after deliberation while trying to find a partner without prior discussion.
Besides, even in the situation where the game players are allowed to communicate with each other, such as negotiation, focal point can still be useful for them selecting an appropriate equilibrium: When the negotiation is about to the end, each player must make the last-minute decision about how aggressive they should be and to what extent they should trust their opponents (Hyde, 2017).
[3] While breaking symmetries may allow for higher utilities, it results in unnatural, inhuman strategies.