[3] Samper studied in the Gimnasio Moderno, a prestigious secondary school in Bogotá,[4] and attended the Pontifical Xavierian University, graduating in 1972 with a degree in economics.

[6] In 1993, when the 1994 presidential campaign was in its early stages, it became increasingly clear that the race was going to be close, particularly between Samper and Andrés Pastrana, the candidate of the Colombian Conservative Party: opinion polls were sharply divided.

The results of the first round caused the Samper campaign team to secure additional funding to help widen the margin over the opposing candidate.

In what can be described as an attempt to win at all cost, the campaign turned to the Cali Cartel, receiving cash donations in excess of $6 million US dollars.

[citation needed] On 19 June 1994, after three weeks of arduous campaigning, Samper was elected president in the second-round voting, once again by a narrow margin, 50.37% to 48.64%, over Pastrana, being sworn in in August.

[9][10] Shortly after his presidential victory, Samper was accused by Pastrana of having received campaign donations from the Cali Cartel of $3.75 million US dollars, with journalist Alberto Giraldo Lopez as the intermediary.

[12] Gustavo de Greiff, Colombia's outgoing Chief Prosecutor cleared Samper of wrongdoing,[13] after what critics termed a "less-than-exhaustive" investigation.

Valdivieso was a cousin of the late Luis Carlos Galán, a charismatic Liberal party presidential candidate assassinated in 1989 by the Medellín Cartel for his political views, particularly for favoring the extradition of drug lords to the United States.

Although Samper's campaign treasurer, Santiago Medina, came under investigation, Valdivieso refused to re-open the "narco-cassette case" that had been closed by de Greiff.

[16] Just after Medina's arrest, Samper gave a unscheduled, nationally televised address where he admitted the possibility that drug money had gone to his campaign.

[23][24] Cardinal Pedro Rubiano, a leader of Colombia's Catholic Church, stated in an interview that not knowing that drug money financed part of the presidential campaign was similar to not noticing an elephant entering one's living room.

[30] On 15 March 1996, the Colombian supreme court opened an investigation into three cabinet members—Horacio Serpa, Rodrigo Pardo and Juan Manuel Turbay—alleged to be involved in the scandal.

[32] In June 1995, Samper claimed that his administration had made considerable progress in fighting the drug war—which had cost Colombia "countless lives" in the previous ten years, "including more than 3,000 police officers and soldiers, 23 judges, 63 journalists and four presidential candidates"—by launching an "integrated, multi-front attack on the cartels" that targeted "bank accounts, laboratories, crops, chemicals, transportation systems and political connections.

[33] By August, five more cartel leaders—Henry Loaiza-Ceballos, Victor Patiño-Fomeque, José Santacruz Londoño, Phanor Arizabaleta-Arzayus, and Miguel Rodríguez Orejuela—had been arrested, leaving Hélmer Herrera the only top leader at large.

Now controlling about 80 percent of the global multibillion-dollar cocaine trade, the loose-knit Cali syndicate is considered ... to be one of the most difficult criminal enterprises to penetrate.

With an intelligence apparatus encompassing hotel clerks, corrupt policemen and politicians and a taxi fleet of several thousand, the movements of police and army units are constantly monitored.

To combat such corruption, Gen. Rosso José Serrano, commander of the National Police ... [i]n the last two months ... [has] kicked out 220 officers ... 400 noncommissioned officers and 1,600 other policemen ... soldiers assigned to anti-drug duty, members of an elite 150-man unit trained as a shock force[,] live in utter isolation ... None of the soldiers ... is from the Cali area ...[35] In less than 30 days, five of the cartel's seven most wanted members have been put behind bars.

His boss, National Police Director Ross Serrano, described a more complex overall strategy—first closing down the private security agencies, taxi fleets and beeper companies that gave the cartel leaders bodyguards, safe transport and communications; arresting many of their messengers and lower-level employees to isolate them; and freezing their bank accounts to crimp cash flow.

[33] Samper stated that further measures to be taken should focus on increased international cooperation, including sharing information to speed up investigations and prosecutions, working toward implementing a treaty to stop cartel money laundering through established financial institutions, restricting the trade in precursor chemicals, enhancing international financial support for crop substitution, and holding a world summit on drugs.

[33] Shortly after Samper's election and disturbed by the release of the taped phone conversations compromising the integrity of the president-elect, the US Senate unanimously approved a measure that would make anti-narcotic financial aid to Colombia conditional on the government's commitment to fighting drug trafficking.

In reply, Colombian foreign minister Noemí Sanín said that Colombia was prepared to fight the drug war without the United States, and that the measure was "disrespectful".

[38] For years, Samper's administration was lambasted by the US for its supposed failure to make every effort to effectively fight the war against cocaine and the Cali Cartel.