It was organized by a group of young Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) officers with the goal of purging the government and military leadership of their factional rivals and ideological opponents.

Their supporters in the army made attempts to capitalize on their actions, but divisions within the military, combined with Imperial anger at the coup, meant they were unable to achieve a change of government.

The radical Kōdōha faction lost its influence within the army, while the military, now free from infighting, increased its control over the civilian government, which had been severely weakened by the assassination of key moderate and liberal-minded leaders.

[4][5][6] The Kōdō-ha emphasized the importance of Japanese culture, spiritual purity over material quality, and the need to attack the Soviet Union (Hokushin-ron), while the Tōsei-ha officers, who were strongly influenced by the ideas of the contemporary German general staff, supported central economic and military planning (total war theory), technological modernization, mechanization and expansion within China (Nanshin-ron).

To them, the "privileged classes" exploited the people, leading to widespread poverty in rural areas, and deceived the Emperor, usurping his power and weakening Japan.

Involved at least to some extent in most of the political violence of the period, following the March and October incidents of 1931, the army and navy members of the group split and largely ended their association with civilian nationalists.

It had sympathizers among the general staff and the Imperial Family, most notably Prince Chichibu, the Emperor's brother (and, until 1933, his heir), who was friends with Nishida and other Kokutai Genri-ha leaders.

This incident is significant because it convinced the young army officers (who were aware of, but not involved in, the attack) of the need to utilize troops in any potential coup attempt.

The two were convinced that the incident was a Tōsei-ha attack on the young officers and began circulating a pamphlet calling for a "housecleaning" of the IJA and naming Tetsuzan Nagata as the "chief villain".

Andō's position in the 3rd Infantry Regiment (the largest source of troops) was essential to the plot, so Muranaka and Nonaka spoke with him repeatedly, ultimately wearing down his resistance.

[33][34][35] The uprising was planned in a series of meetings held between 18 and 22 February by Nishida, Yasuhide Kurihara, Teruzō Andō, Hisashi Kōno, Takaji Muranaka and Asaichi Isobe.

These included Araki, Minister of War Yoshiyuki Kawashima, Jinzaburō Mazaki, Tomoyuki Yamashita, Kanji Ishiwara, Shigeru Honjō and their own immediate commanders, Kōhei Kashii and Takeo Hori.

[37][38] The young officers prepared an explanation of their intentions and grievances in a document entitled "Manifesto of the Uprising" (蹶起趣意書, Kekki Shuisho), which they wanted to be handed to the Emperor.

According to his account, the attack was only canceled after the officers assigned to carry it out (teachers at a military school in Toyohashi, Aichi Prefecture) could not agree over the use of cadets in the operation.

This heartened the rebel officers because it reminded them of the 1860 Sakuradamon Incident in which shishi (political activists with ambitions) assassinated Ii Naosuke, the chief adviser to the Shōgun, in the name of the Emperor.

[61][62] Captain Hisashi Kōno commanded a team consisting of seven members, including six civilians, to attack Makino, who was staying at Kōfūsō, part of the ryokan Itōya in Yugawara, Kanagawa Prefecture, with his family.

[63][64] At approximately 10:00, Kurihara and Nakahashi boarded three trucks with sixty men and traveled from the Prime Minister's Residence to the offices of the Asahi Shimbun, a prominent liberal newspaper.

[66][67] 1st Lieutenant Motoaki Nakahashi of the 3rd Imperial Guard assembled 135 men and, telling his commanders that they were going to pay their respects at Yasukuni Shrine (or Meiji Jingū; sources differ), marched to Takahashi's personal residence.

Nakahashi's unit was the scheduled emergency relief company (赴援隊, fuentai), and he told the commander of the palace guard, Major Kentarō Honma, that he had been dispatched to reinforce the gates because of the attacks earlier that morning.

[85][86] After the occupation of the police headquarters, 2nd Lieutenant Kinjirō Suzuki led a small group to attack the nearby residence of Fumio Gotō, the Home Minister.

They took a hard line, advising the Emperor that he should demand that efforts be concentrated on suppressing the uprising and that he must not accept the resignation of the current government, as doing so would "effectively be granting victory to the rebel army".

[92][93] The Supreme Military Council (SMC) held an unofficial meeting in the afternoon, attended by a number of other officers including Kashii, Yamashita, Kawashima and Hajime Sugiyama, Vice Chief of Staff.

The cabinet initially opposed this measure, as it feared it would be used to impose military rule (just as the young officers hoped), but they had no choice but to approve it after Kawashima insisted it was necessary to resolve the uprising.

By the afternoon of 27 February forty warships were stationed in Tokyo Bay and the navy's land forces (rikusentai) had been dispatched to defend naval installations in the city.

The rebel officers refused, correctly pointing out that it was only because they had fully armed troops behind them the generals were prepared to listen, and again spoke of the need to promote the Shōwa Restoration and form a "strong cabinet centered around the military".

When Honjō spoke in defense of the officers' motives, the Emperor angrily replied "killing my ministers is tantamount to strangling me with cotton wool" and added that the rebels deserved no leniency.

[122] A meeting of the heads of the army – including Kawashima, Kashii and Sugiyama – had been held from the early morning onward (Araki and Mazaki had attempted to attend but had been told to leave, as the SMC had no authority).

Three planes scattered leaflets from the air, a giant ad balloon adorned with the words, "The Imperial Command has been issued, do not resist the Army colors!"

Charged with rebellion (反乱罪, hanran-zai), the rebel officers argued that their actions had been approved by the Minister of War's Proclamation and their incorporation into the martial law forces, and that they had never been formally presented with the imperial command.

Of the twelve full generals in the army, nine were removed from active service by the end of April, including Kōdō-ha members Araki, Mazaki, Kawashima and Honjō.