§§ 3161–3174[1]) establishes time limits for completing the various stages of a federal criminal prosecution in the United States.
[5] In United States v. Rojas-Contreras, 474 U.S. 231 (1985), the Supreme Court held that this 30-day trial preparation period is not restarted upon the filing of a substantially similar superseding indictment.
If the indictment is dismissed at the defendant's request, the Act's provisions apply anew upon reinstatement of the charge.
[17] Furthermore, the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD) provides its own time limits for persons incarcerated in other jurisdictions.
[19] Even if a charge is brought within the period provided by the statute of limitations, a defendant may be able to show that preaccusation delay has violated his or her Fifth Amendment due process rights.
[20] A defendant's rights under the Speedy Trial Clause of the Sixth Amendment are triggered by "either a formal indictment or information or else the actual restraints imposed by arrest and holding to answer a criminal charge.
[23] In United States v. Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. 302 (1986), where the reason for the 90-month delay (interlocutory appeals) did not weigh against the government, the Supreme Court held that the possibility of prejudice occasioned by the delay was not sufficient to establish a Sixth Amendment speedy trial violation.
Moreover, the courts of appeals routinely reject Sixth Amendment speedy trial challenges in the absence of a showing of prejudice.
[24] However, in Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647 (1992), the Supreme Court held that an "extraordinary" eight-and-one-half-year delay between the defendant's indictment and arrest, which resulted from the government's "egregious persistence in failing to prosecute [him]," violated his right to a speedy trial even in the absence of "affirmative proof of particularized prejudice.