In the special case where a member of Congress is the defendant, the Speech or Debate Clause places certain restrictions on the actions that can be prosecuted and proved up.
[5] The judicial bribery provision of the Crimes Act of 1790, passed the following year, provided for disqualification, and a fine and imprisonment "at the discretion of the court," for both the judge and the payor.
"[17] In 1977, Thomas H. Henderson, Jr., the Chief of the Public Integrity Section, wrote: Until recently, the full panoply of potential federal resources had not been brought to bear effectively on corruption schemes at the state and local level.
From the time of Tammany Hall this country has been painfully aware of the existence of corrupt practices in many of our metropolitan areas, and of the "machines" and "rings" which siphon off millions of dollars from public treasuries for private gain.
Most state and local prosecutors, beset by inadequate resources and the overwhelming demands of a rising rate of street crime, are simply unable to deal with this type of corruption.
Moreover, in some cases, local law enforcement is part and parcel of the problem itself, due to the outright corruption of its own establishment.
Finally, the offenses differ in whether they are predicates for Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act and money laundering prosecutions, and in the maximum authorized prison sentence that may be imposed upon conviction.
§ 201(c)(1) provides: In United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of California (1999), the Supreme Court held that the gratuity statute required a nexus to an official act, but not a quid pro quo.
§ 666, criminalizes the corrupt offer of anything of value intending to influence an agent in connection with a transaction exceeding $5,000, and involving a government or organization receiving at least $10,000 in federal funds.
[43] Despite academic suggestions to the contrary,[44] in Salinas v. United States (1997), the Supreme Court held that the transaction itself need not involve federal funds.
§ 1343, statutes criminalize any scheme or artifice to obtain money or property by fraud in connection with a mail or wire communication, respectively.
[59] "The major problems faced by federal prosecutors in applying [the mail and wire fraud statutes] to political schemes is establishing that the defendant intentionally attempted to defraud the victims of something of value within the meaning of the States.
[62] One intangible form of property recognized under the mail and wire fraud statutes is the right to control the disposition of government funds.
"[77] The Hobbs Act criminalizes, inter alia, the obtaining of property with consent by actual or threatened fear, if interstate commerce is affected.
[78] In a law review article published while the appeal in Kenny was pending,[81] Stern wrote: In 1971, Stern wrote that the Hobbs Act was "one of the major statutes under which the federal government can combat local political corruption where the state is either unable or unwilling to do so," citing the Travel Act as the "other major statute.
[88] In McCormick v. United States (1991), the Supreme Court held that the "under color of official right" prong of the Hobbs Act could be used to prosecute political corruption as long as there was a quid pro quo.
[90] The next year, in Evans v. United States (1992), the Court held that no affirmative act of inducement is required on the part of the public official.
§ 1952, criminalizes, inter alia, the use of interstate travel or the mail to distribute the proceeds of, or promote or manage, unlawful activity, including extortion or bribery.
[99] According to Curato et al.: "In the 1970s, federal prosecutors began to argue that RICO was applicable to corrupt state and local government bodies.
"[101] With the exception of program bribery, all of the aforementioned offenses are predicates for liability under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO).
"[103] As Henderson wrote in 1977, "if a governmental unit can be classified as an enterprise within the meaning of the statute, it could have great impact on the ability of prosecutors to reach political crimes.
[117] Professor John C. Coffee argues that "there is a more modest role for the Guarantee Clause" in distinguishing between public and private corruption under the same statutes.
"[119] United States v. Johnson (1966) was the first case in which the Supreme Court held that the Clause barred a corruption prosecution.
§ 281 (the federal conflict-of-interest statute) or § 371 (conspiracy to defraud the United States) to show the motivation for the introduction of a private bill.
[121] Representative Thomas Francis Johnson had agreed to make a speech in the House and intercede with the Department of Justice on behalf of a savings and loan association in exchange for a campaign contribution and legal fees.
"[123] Brewster reinstated a dismissed § 201 indictment because the crime of bribery is complete once the bribe is accepted, whether or not the official performs the promised act.
[124] In United States v. Helstoski (1979), the Court held that the prosecution may not introduce any evidence of a past "legislative act" at trial.
[125] According to Weeks, "[a]s a practical matter, it is extremely difficult to successfully prosecute a section 201 action if reference to a defendant's legislative acts is forbidden.
"[126] Charles Ruff referred to "the prosecution of local officials for acts of public corruption" as "perhaps the most sensitive area of federal-state cooperation.
"[132] Similarly, the courts have consistently rejected claims by convicted state legislators that their prosecutions violate the Tenth Amendment.