The Court affirmed a judgement in Blacksmith's favor, notwithstanding the fact that the Seneca had executed an Indian removal treaty and the Company held the exclusive right to purchase to the land by virtue of an interstate compact ratified by Congress.

"[2] Following the precedents of the Marshall Court, Fellows was "decided at a time when the government was still dealing with Indian tribes as if they were semi-sovereign nations.

Ely S. Parker, one of the administrators of the Blacksmith estate, went on to draft the surrender at Appomattox and to become the first indigenous Commissioner of Indian Affairs.

[10] The uniform rule of these cases, enunciated most clearly in Johnson v. McIntosh (1823), was that non-Indians could not acquire valid land title from such private purchases.

[15] An 1821 opinion of U.S. Attorney General William Wirt, interpreting Fletcher and Johnson, argued that: "The Seneca Indians must be protected in the enjoyment of exclusive possession of their lands, as defined and bounded in the Treaty of Canandaigua, until they have voluntarily relinquished it.

[20] The Holland Land Company consummated much of its pre-emptive right in the Treaty of Big Tree (1797), extinguishing all Seneca aboriginal title west of the Genesee River except in ten reservations.

[25] Blacksmith had constructed an "Indian sawmill and yard" on his enclosed tract within the Tonawanda Reservation in Pembroke, Genesee County, New York circa 1826.

[27] The Ogden Land Company claimed title to the Tonawanda Reservation by virtue of its right of pre-emption, consummated by the treaties.

[8] Represented by lawyer John H. Martindale, Blacksmith sued Joseph Fellows and Robert Kendle, agents of the Land Company, for the torts of assault and battery and trespass, quare clausum fregit, with the sawmill as the locus in quo.

[34] Third, he argued that the Seneca's rights under the treaty were only enforceable against the federal government, and did not affect the defendant's title as a condition precedent.

[37] Welles, in dissent, agreed that Blacksmith could individually sue for trespass, but disagreed that the appraisal was a condition precedent; he would have reversed and granted a new trial, with costs.

[41]A letter to the editor of the New York Times—which criticizes a previous article for creating the "impression that the Indians at Tonawanda are very nearly the equal in agriculture, general intelligence, and in the customs of civilized life, of their white neighbors"—concurs with this assessment of Parker's role: I have not a word to say in the disparagement of the intellectual ability of Ely S. Parker, their head chief, and cheerfully unite with "W.H.P."

in awarding him the credit for making valuable suggestions to his counsel on the argument of the case in the Supreme Court of the United States[.]

It was first made in a supplementary brief printed after the opening argument of counsel on the other side had been commenced, and not handed in until the second day, just previous to its conclusion.

Dred Scott, in dicta, opined the following on aboriginal title: The situation of [blacks] was altogether unlike that of the Indian race.

The Court observed: Neither treaty made any provision as to the mode or manner in which the removal of the Indians or surrender of the reservations was to take place.

The plaintiff in this case was expelled by force; and unless this mode of removal can be sustained, the recovery against the defendants for the trespass was right, and must be affirmed.

"[47] "[A]ny other mode of a forcible removal," the Court argued, would not "be consistent with the peace of the country, or with the duty of the Government to these dependent people, who have been influenced by its counsel and authority to change their habitations.

"[48] Because the treaty had been negotiated "with them as a quasi nation, possessing some of the attributes of an independent people, and to be dealt with accordingly," the Court held that "unless otherwise expressly stipulated" only the federal government had the "authority or power" to execute the agreement.

"[48] Thus, the court held that the private beneficiaries of Native American treaties could neither expel tribes by force or by a cause of action for ejectment.

[49] The court observed that "this interpretation is in accordance with the usages and practice of the Government in providing for the removal of Indian tribes from their ancient possessions, with the fitness and propriety of the thing itself," and with the text of the treaty.

[55] Before the Supreme Court, Martindale was joined by New York Attorney General John Van Buren and opposed by A. Taber and J. L.

[61] Judge Edgar C. Dibble, of the Genesee County Court (1846, 1851–1854) and a one-time partner of Martindale,[56] granted the writ of removal.

The Court of Appeals held that the state statute did not violate the New York Constitution and that a jury trial was not required because the defendants had no property right.

[42] The Court eventually affirmed in 1858, holding that the state statute did not violate the Indian Commerce Clause, the federal Nonintercourse Act, or the treaty.

[61] The key claim advanced by lawyer John H. Martindale in all four cases had been that the Treaty of Buffalo Creek (1838) was invalid because it was not signed by the Seneca leaders with the authority to cede the Tonawanda Reservation, and the signatures it did contain were obtained by coercion or fraud.

As Brown notes: The principal point, however, on which the counsel relied, and which he hoped to establish, was that the Tonawandas were not bound by the Treaties, because the chiefs there protested against and refused to sign them.

The Court's ruling meant that as long as the federal government was determined to take no action to remove them from Tonawanda, the Ogden Company was powerless to do so.

"[69] Plaintiff Ely S. Parker went on to become a member of General Ulysses S. Grant's staff during the American Civil War, drawing up the terms of the surrender at Appomattox Court House.

[70][71] According to his New York Times obituary, Parker "negotiated the removal of his tribe from this State to the fertile and pleasant lands on Green Bay, Wisconsin.